US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
3-1-2007

Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security
Threats
Susan L. Craig Ms

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Craig, Susan L. Ms, "Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats" (2007).
Monographs, Books, and Publications. 690.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/690

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF TRADITIONAL
AND NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS

Susan L. Craig

March 2007

Visit our website for other free publication downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined
in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the
public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States
Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department
of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This
report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
I would like to thank the Foreign Military Studies Office for providing me the opportunity and freedom to research “whatever I wanted”
while I worked there. Specifically, I appreciate the encouragement and
counsel of Dr. Jacob Kipp, Mr. Tim Thomas, and Mr. Scott Henderson.
The Air Force’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) provided
funding for my travel to Shanghai. Dr. Brad Roberts of the Institute for
Defense Analyses also provided much appreciated advice and wisdom.
And a special thanks to my favorite editor, my husband, Jim, who is a
constant source of encouragement and support. Of course, all mistakes
are mine alone.
*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the
SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report
also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newsletter to update the national security community on the research
of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming
conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are
interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our
homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-287-X
ii

CONTENTS
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS  . . . . . . . . 25
I. The United States: The Hegemonic Threat  . . 27
II. The Threat from Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
III. The Threat from India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
IV. Conclusion: China’s Traditional Threats . . . . 97
3. NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS  . . 101
I. China’s Threat from Within: “Domestic
		 and Social Contradictions” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
II. Environmental Degradation: The Threat
		 to the Earth, Economic Growth and the
		 Communist Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
III. Energy Insecurity: China’s “Soft Rib”  . . . . . 120
IV. Conclusion: China’s Nontraditional Threats  . 129
4. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
ENDNOTES  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
ABOUT THE AUTHOR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

iii

FOREWORD
While “knowing your enemy” has long been a Chinese
stratagem, cultural intelligence only recently has gained
precedence in American military strategy. Our efforts
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on terror remind us
of how differently much of the rest of the world thinks
and perceives. This monograph is an effort to better
understand Chinese thinking. Ms. Susan Craig’s research
into Chinese threat perceptions is important for several
reasons. Above all, it provides valuable insight into the
comprehensiveness of the Chinese concept of national
security and how China perceives itself, the world, and
China’s place within it. Further, the author’s deliberate
effort to maintain a Chinese perspective by relying solely
on Chinese sources—namely, scholarly journals, the news
media, official policy pronouncements, and personal
interviews—demonstrates that Chinese intentions and
motivations are not a secret. The author’s research shows
that there is a significant amount of information about
Chinese concerns, perceptions, and motivations that is
available openly, and that many of China’s influential
elite are willing and able to meet and openly exchange
ideas. Also, it shows that there is an active arena for
debate in China on national security issues. Likely due
to the rapidly changing international environment and
China’s growing interest and participation in it, Chinese
perceptions about its national security are more diverse,
nuanced, and sophisticated today than ever before. By
acknowledging that Chinese thinking is not monolithic,
we can better appreciate and influence debates that are
occurring.
While Ms. Craig’s analysis shows that the Chinese
perspective is very different from our own, it also shows
that the two perspectives may share a common view of
the future. Both the United States and China aspire to a


future with a free, open, and robust economic marketplace
and an international order where all nations contribute
to peace, development, and prosperity (in other words,
where we are all “responsible stakeholders”). Despite
Chinese fears, the United States does not strive to
overturn the current world order; we have as much at
stake in maintaining it as China does. We also confront
similar nontraditional threats: terrorism, pollution,
proliferation, energy insecurity, drug trafficking, and
infectious disease. With cooperation in pursuing shared
goals and overcoming shared threats, the threats we each
perceive as posed by the other are likely to diminish.
If that is not reason enough to study China’s threat
perceptions, perhaps beating the Chinese at their own
game is. As Ms. Craig’s research demonstrates, China’s
influential elite spends a great deal of time studying
American policy and politics and has a very good
understanding of American threat perceptions. Many of
China’s recent policies and actions are direct responses
to American criticisms and concerns. We could take
additional actions to allay Chinese concerns and limit
misunderstanding if only we better understood these
concerns. Or we could decide not to dispel perceived
U.S. threats to China. Either way, an understanding of
China’s perceptions of national security threats provides
the United States with increased opportunities for
action and cooperation and a decreased likelihood of
misunderstanding and conflict. For all of these reasons,
the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as a contribution to the national security
discourse on China.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In order to begin to understand the motivations
and decisions of China’s leadership, and in order to
behave in a manner such that we can influence them,
we must try to understand the world as China does.
This research is an attempt to do so by examining the
writings and opinions of China’s scholars, journalists,
and leaders—its influential elite. It will show that
China has a comprehensive concept of national security
that includes not only defending its sovereignty and
territorial integrity, but continuing its economic and
social development and maintaining its international
stature.
There are two main types of threats to China’s
national security: traditional and nontraditional.
Traditional threats can be characterized loosely as
threats to a nation emanating from other nations and
involving a military component. While the most talkedabout threat to China’s territory is a declaration of
independence by Taiwan, the influential elite actually
find this possibility unlikely. The focus is therefore
on the few countries considered both capable of and
willing to endanger all three of China’s components of
national security: sovereignty, economic development,
and international stature. The United States, Japan,
and India have significant ideological, historical, or
territorial disagreements with China and possess the
military, economic, and/or international diplomatic
means to go to battle over such differences. While
China’s influential elite are concerned about a direct
military confrontation with the United States, Japan,
and India, they are far more concerned about the
possibility of containment efforts by any—or all—of
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these countries. The threat of containment, however,
is less of a military threat and more of a diplomatic,
political, and economic one. The influential elite also
express concern over the fluctuating, unpredictable,
and seemingly unstable nature of the democratic
process in all of these countries.
Even more troublesome to China’s security
environment are nontraditional threats. While military
deterrence and diplomatic skill have managed
traditional threats successfully to date, they are
insufficient for overcoming nontraditional threats. Such
threats, while never precisely defined by the influential
elite, are considered to transcend national boundaries,
go beyond the military sphere, are unpredictable and/
or unexpected, have both internal and external elements
and ramifications, and are frequently interwoven
with traditional security threats. There is an array of
nontraditional threats facing China: bird flu, terrorism,
proliferation, drug trafficking, AIDS, and piracy, to
name a few. The focus of this monograph is on three
nontraditional threats: economic and social disparities
within China, environmental degradation, and energy
insecurity.
At least three conclusions can be reached from
an examination of these nontraditional threats. First,
China’s leadership is very concerned about all of
them as demonstrated by the extent of public rhetoric
voiced and the policies implemented. Second, while
the leadership is very vocal and active in addressing
these threats, scholars offer surprisingly little analysis
of them, at least publicly. This absence of analysis or
recommendations is striking, given scholarly consensus
that nontraditional threats endanger national security
more than traditional ones. This may be due to the
third conclusion: China’s central leadership is largely
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unable to implement its policy priorities. Mitigating
nontraditional threats therefore requires serious
internal reforms. China will need to strengthen its
social safety net, judicial system, and mechanisms for
resolving public concerns. It will need to become more
flexible so as to be better able to respond in times of
crisis. It will need to more effectively enforce penalties
for corruption and pollution. China’s nontraditional
threats are more menacing than traditional ones
because they require China’s leadership not only to
look outward in efforts to foster cooperation, but also
to look inward and make serious internal reforms as
well.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese
motivations and decisionmaking.
The Pentagon’s Annual Report to Congress:
The Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China 20051

Understanding any one person’s decisionmaking
is extremely difficult. It is exponentially harder when
seeking to understand how and why a state makes the
decisions it does. Organizations and individuals, to
include their interests, biases, and perceptions, all play
a significant role in the decisionmaking of a nation.
How much of a role they play is hard to measure.2
However, we do not need to know exactly how much
perceptions influence behavior if we can agree on the
following: In order to understand others’ behavior,
and in order to behave in a manner such that we can
influence others, we must try to understand the world as
they do.
Even this is difficult, given language barriers and
inherent biases, but the effort to do so at least reminds
us that ours is not the only perspective. This research
on China’s perceptions of threats to its national security
is therefore an attempt to see the world as China
does. As the epigraph above reminds us, much about
China’s government remains a mystery. We can begin
to demystify it somewhat by attempting to glimpse the
world through Chinese eyes.
This monograph attempts to view the world
through China’s eyes by examining the writings and


opinions of Chinese scholars and Chinese news media.
The news media are state-controlled, so it hardly offers
an unfettered perspective, but it is the primary source
of information for China’s public. The perceptions
both projected by and formed as a result of China’s
mainstream news media thus provide a good starting
place for getting to know the Chinese perspective.
The thoughts of Chinese scholars as presented
through academic journals provide another avenue
for getting to know the Chinese point of view.
Research institutes where Chinese scholars work,
unlike American think tanks, are subordinate to and
funded by the Central government. As employees of
the government, these are more than just scholars, they
also are intelligence analysts and policy advisors. They
provide the political leadership with classified reports
and briefings through official government channels.
Literally referred to as the government’s “external
brain,” China’s think tanks provide a “secret factor in
the success of the decision maker.”3 They also inform
the public through their unclassified publications and
their scholars’ appearances in the broadcast news
media. Thus, at the least, scholars in China’s research
institutes are influential in the formulation of both
public and official perceptions, and potentially they
are directly and authoritatively influential in official
Chinese decisionmaking. Because of the influence
that China’s news media and scholars have on the
public’s and officials’ perceptions, they, along with
China’s decisionmakers, will be referred to collectively
hereafter as China’s “influential elite.”4
The recent writings of China’s influential elite,
some of which were published in English but most
of which needed to be translated, are the main focus
of this research. Interviews conducted by the author



with a number of the influential elite further inform
this work. A conscious effort was made not to read or
cite American scholars in order to maintain a strictly
Chinese perspective. In doing so, it became clear that
despite controlled news media, there is an open and
active arena for debate in China, at least on some
topics. This was made especially clear in the interviews
conducted, as the influential elite demonstrated
surprising candor and independent thinking. Likely
due to the rapidly changing international environment
and China’s growing interest and participation in it,
Chinese opinions regarding China’s national security
are more diversified, nuanced, and sophisticated
today than ever before. Michael Pillsbury and
David Shambaugh both conducted similar research,
interviewing Chinese scholars and policymakers and
assessing their perspectives.5 But these works are
already outdated, likely as a result of China’s greater
global interactions today. As China opens to the global
marketplace, so, too, does it open to the marketplace of
ideas.
This does not mean that the perceptions held by
China’s influential elite are necessarily accurate. But
their accuracy is not as important as understanding
what the perceptions are and how they differ from
our own. (For this reason, the accuracy of Chinese
perceptions presented here will not be challenged.)
For example, during a speech in Singapore in June
2005, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
expressed the belief that China did not face any threats
from other nations.6 China’s influential elite have a very
different perception. Not only do China’s influential
elite believe China’s national security is threatened
“traditionally” by other nations such as the United
States, Japan, and India, they also believe China faces



serious nontraditional threats from issues such as
social disparities within the country, environmental
degradation, and energy dependency. Each of these
threats is examined in turn. While these are not the
only threats China fears, they do provide insight into
how China thinks about its security environment and
what is—and is not—considered threatening to China’s
national security.
As Secretary Rumsfeld’s remarks remind us,
Americans do not appreciate fully China’s security
environment. By focusing on that nation’s threat
perceptions, we not only learn about how the Chinese
view their security environment, we gain insight
into what is perhaps the most motivating factor
behind decisionmaking and action by the Chinese
government. This survey does not examine the role the
Communist Party plays in decisionmaking or the many
other dynamics that shape Chinese decisionmaking,
mostly because the nature of China’s closed society
makes doing so extremely difficult. Nonetheless, this
examination allows us to better appreciate how and
why Chinese perceptions differ from our own. And
in doing so, we can begin to understand Chinese
leadership motivations and decisionmaking.
While many of our perceptions as Americans differ
from those of the Chinese, this assessment also will
demonstrate that there are a number of perceptions,
concerns, and values that we share. Understanding
where our interests and concerns coincide provides a
valuable opportunity for cooperation. If understanding
our similarities and differences is not reason enough
to study China’s threat perceptions, perhaps beating
them at their own game is. China’s influential elite
spend a great deal of time studying American policy
and have a very good understanding of American



threat perceptions. Many of China’s recent declared
positions—for example, positions on peaceful
development, arms control, and greater transparency—
are direct responses to American criticisms and
concerns. We could take reciprocal actions to allay
Chinese concerns and limit misunderstanding if we
better understood what those concerns were. Even if
we decide not to dispel threats perceived by China,
it is better to make such decisions deliberately and
knowingly. Either way, an understanding of China’s
perceptions of national security threats provides
the United States with increased opportunities for
action and cooperation and a decreased likelihood of
misunderstanding and conflict.
How China Perceives.
Before examining what it is that the Chinese perceive,
let us consider how the Chinese perceive. Richard Nisbett,
an American psychologist, studied the differences in
Western and Asian thought processes and found rather
striking differences in the way we process information
and view the world. He differentiated the two thought
processes in this way. Western thought, descended
from the ancient Greek philosophers, is analytic and
atomistic. The world can be understood by studying
individual objects as discrete and separate from their
environments. Rational thought, logic, and debate can
lead to one right answer. The individual is paramount
and is in control of events around him. Easterners, on
the other hand, products of the teachings of Taoism,
Confucianism, and Buddhism, see the world in a more
holistic light. In order to understand events, one must
look to a host of factors and understand their relation to
one another. The individual is defined by relationships



and is subordinate to the community, where harmony
and balance are paramount. One cannot control events
so much as learn to adapt to them. This is important
because the world is constantly changing. While
Western strategic thought strives to determine the
right answer in a logical and systematic way, Eastern
strategic thought is founded on dialecticism, using
contradictions to understand relations among events or
objects. Dialecticism does not seek to decontextualize
and find one answer, but instead to see things in their
appropriate, complex context, perhaps leading to more
than one answer.7
While Nisbett’s characterization of Eastern and
Western thought may be too simplifying in an increasingly globalized world, the differences he ascribes
to our respective cultures are useful in attempting to
comprehend an Eastern viewpoint through a Western
lens. Understanding dialecticism and the holistic
perspective that colors Eastern thought processes will
do much to enlighten our understanding of why China
perceives the threats they do and how they think about
them in a comprehensive and interconnected way.
How China Perceives Itself.
It is also important to understand how China’s
influential elite perceive their own country before
examining their assessment of others. There are
several themes consistent throughout Chinese writing,
all based on the premise of Chinese exceptionalism.8
Specifically, the Chinese see their country as unlike any
other, given their long history, pursuit of peace, and
inherently defensive rather than offensive approach
to international relations. Each of these concepts will
be addressed briefly. Finally, China’s influential elite



take a comparative and quantitative approach when
looking at their country in relation to the rest of the
world. They see a China rising in power in a world
that is trending towards multipolarity. This trend
favors China’s approach to international relations and
is bound to further increase China’s role and stature
on the world stage. But this time frame, in which their
power is growing and the world is becoming more
multipolar, is limited and fraught with danger. It is a
window of strategic opportunity for China, which must
make the most of it, continuing its fast-paced economic
developments and social transformation while limiting
any external threats to peace and stability.
The Chinese influential elite uniformly espouse
the idea that China is unique and does not behave as
other states do. China is very proud of its 5,000 years of
history and culture. For 2 millennia, China considered
itself the hub of civilization. Lieutenant General Li Jijun,
in attempting to explain China to an audience at the
U.S. Army War College, noted proudly that “China is
the only uninterrupted civilization in world history.”9
Chinese historians often boast that China has engaged
in more than 6,000 battles in 4,000 years. General Li
credited the country’s longevity despite these conflicts
to “the soul of the Chinese nation, which makes
unremitting efforts for self-improvement and stresses
morality and respect for others and national unity.”10 The
importance of national unity to the Chinese is a result
of invasions and defeats suffered at the hands of the
West in the 19th century. This “century of humiliation”
had a profound effect on China’s self-image, which
long had been one of cultural, technological, and moral
superiority. This experience likely contributed to what
General Li termed a Chinese “unifying consciousness”
dedicated to “maintaining the unity of the country and
its territorial integrity and sovereignty.”11


Despite frequent invasions and threats to China’s
territory, China maintained its pursuit of peace.
The oft-told story of explorer Zheng He has come
to symbolize this uniquely peaceful disposition to
the Chinese. Eighty-seven years before Christopher
Columbus’ voyage across the Atlantic, Zheng He made
seven voyages, involving 27,000 people and 200 ships,
to more than 30 countries and regions. As Lieutenant
General Li Jijun told the students at the U.S. Army
War College, “Unlike later Western explorers who
conquered the land they discovered, this fleet did not
subdue the newly discovered lands by force. This was
not a voyage to plunder the local populace for treasure
nor was it one to establish overseas colonies.” Zheng’s
mission was “simply to convey friendship and goodwill
and to promote economic and cultural exchanges.”12
On the 600th anniversary of Zheng’s first expedition,
the China Daily featured an opinion piece on Zheng’s
peaceful missions, noting how they are still symbolic
of China’s peaceful nature: “Six hundred years after
Zheng, China cherishes a similar desire to befriend
the world. But regrettably its goodwill is demonized
because established powers fear a resurgent China.”13
China’s influential elite also see their country as
unique in its emphasis on defense rather than offense.
Mo Zi, a Chinese thinker who lived 5 centuries
before Jesus Christ, is credited with the concept of
“nonoffense.” The Chinese influential elite commonly
refer to the Great Wall as a symbol of this concept.
Professor Qu Xing, Vice President of the Foreign
Affairs College, summarized China’s nonoffensive
posture in this way: “Traditional Chinese culture pays
attention to ‘broad love’ and ‘nonattacking,’ advocates
the ‘kingly way’ of convincing people by reasoning,
despises the ‘domineering way’ of overwhelming



others by force.” 14 Qu demonstrates this by referencing
historic achievements, reminding the reader of China’s
long-standing technological eminence as well as its
nonoffensive disposition: “The Chinese invented
gunpowder, but they do not use it [with] guns to
invade others, the Chinese invented the compass, but
they do not use it to [guide] warships to prowl about
the four seas.”15
Further, there is a unique emphasis in Chinese
writings, both historical and contemporary, on morality
and justice in warfare. As early as the 5th century B.C.,
Chinese military strategists stipulated that wars must
have a just cause, the enemy should be notified of
pending attacks, and innocents should be protected.16
Confucian ideals of benevolence and righteousness,
which further supported the concept of nonoffense,
permeated military strategy then and continue to do
so today. As Zhang Xiaojun and Xu Jia described in a
2004 China Military Science article, military strategists
influenced by Confucianism advocated cautious war
and “opposed rashly beginning war.” Zhang and Xu
conclude that Chinese strategic culture places great
emphasis on just cause to this day as a result: “When
war cannot be avoided, the issues of right and wrong
in the war are of primary importance.”17 The Science
of Military Strategy, the first contemporary book
translated into English that provides real insight into
Chinese thinking on military strategy, asserted that the
justness of a war is determined by its influence on the
development of society. Just wars are considered those
that “facilitate the progress of society and promote
the liberation of productive forces.” Examples of
such war are “people’s war, revolutionary war, and
anti-aggressive war.” Those who hinder the progress
of society, such as perpetrators of “aggressive war,



expansionist war, and predatory wars,” are considered
unjust.18
These concepts of defense and justness in China’s
national security can be traced back to the famous
writings of Sun Tzu and his fellow military theorists.
Their ideas permeated the writings by Mao Zedong
and Deng Xiaoping, and today they are reflected in
the language the government uses to describe its
new security concept. “Active defense,” “peaceful
development,” “win-win,” and “mutual security
through cooperation” all reflect its long-standing
culture of nonaggression, benevolence, and peace.
Whether or not Chinese actions live up to these ideals
can be debated. But it is important to note that even if
Chinese decisionmaking is not guided by the principles
of morality, peace, and defense, Chinese perceive that
their decisions and actions are guided by them. The
Chinese strategists who wrote the Science of Military
Strategy demonstrated this perception: “If a war
breaks out, may it be anti-invasion, anti-separation,
anti-interference, our country will be forced into it. . . .
We [will] have no choice but to take action. The war
will be defensive and just because China would not use
forces in an unlimited and unjust way.”19 So China’s
perception of itself is that it is a country unique in its
peaceful and defensive nature—and all actions, whether
truly defensive or just, nonetheless can be justified by
Chinese perceptions of their righteousness. 20
Because China is so exceptional, its influential elite
believe its rise will be unlike that of any other country
in history. China will be able to develop without
resorting to violence or conflict for two reasons. First,
it does not seek hegemony like other rising powers,
or to challenge the current international system. Ye
Zicheng, Director for Chinese Strategic Studies at
Beijing University, made this distinction:
10

The biggest difference between the now ascendant China
on the one hand, and Germany during World War I and
Japan during World War II on the other, is that China has
no intent to challenge the existing international system
through military expansion. Nor does it seek to create
another international system outside the existing system
to engage in confrontation.21

Second, China’s rise can occur peacefully because of the
globalized economy and China’s importance within it.
Ye continued,
It was necessary for the powers of the past to resort to
military force because they could not achieve the goal
of development using peaceful means. Previously,
markets and resources were divvied up. The only way
to capture them was to use force. Today, even though
there are conflicts between China and the powers in the
allocation of markets and resources, they can be worked
out peacefully.22

The World Trade Organization (WTO), for example,
provides a forum for peaceful dispute resolution that
previously was unavailable to rising nations. It is
worth noting here that despite China’s stated desire to
maintain the current international order, its dramatic
rise inevitably will impact the current international
balance of power. There is little open self-reflection
among China’s influential elite about these likely
worldwide repercussions.
Another concept important to understanding how
China perceives itself, the world, and China’s role
within it is shi, which, as translated from the Chinese
Dictionary, means power or influence, momentum,
or tendency.23 But this does not fully capture the
essence of the word. Chinese linguists define it more
precisely as the “strategic configuration of power” or
“the potential borne of disposition.”24 The significance
11

of shi is that there is an inherent power in all things,
which a good strategist or general or even artist can
take advantage of by understanding and exploiting
their circumstances. From this concept comes a more
tangible one: “comprehensive national power.” Such
power is another uniquely Chinese concept that,
through the country’s traditionally broad perspective,
takes all political, economic, military, scientific,
historical, and societal factors into consideration in
determining a nation’s strength. In contrast to Chinese
perceptions of the Western concept of national power,
which emphasizes influence and force, comprehensive
national power emphasizes survival, development,
and international influence.25
Through a seemingly objective mathematical
calculation (although allocating quantitative values
to a nation’s international influence is in fact highly
subjective), the relative power of nations can be
quantified based on more than their military strength.
Li Changjiu described it this way: “Comprehensive
national strength refers to the organic whole of various
forces possessed by a sovereign state [containing]
various elements including resources, economy,
military, science and technology, education, politics,
diplomacy, and national willpower and cohesive
force.”26
While the concept is an effort to look beyond
military strength in determining a country’s power,
it is a concept that Chinese military thinkers utilize in
defining their strategic outlook and determining their
potential combat effectiveness. As Peng Guangqian
and Yao Youzhi write in The Science of Military Strategy,
comprehensive national power is “the source of combat
effectiveness” and “the fundamental base for war
preparations.”27 If a nation’s comprehensive national
power is strong, it can provide an effective deterrent
12

against attack. But “a nation of minimal strength . . .
hardly can do something for crisis or war control, but
also often becomes the first target to be invaded and
controlled by hegemonists.”28 Thus, while it is far more
than a military concept, it is very important in defining
China’s strategic outlook and determining its military
strategy.
The concept of comprehensive national power
originated in 1997, when the Chinese government
set up a research group comprised of more than 100
scholars to calculate the comprehensive national
power of various countries. The group’s calculations
determined that China ranked seventh in the world in
its comprehensive national power. The more important
conclusion derived from these calculations, though,
is that the Chinese ranking will continue to ascend.
As Li Zhongjie, director of the Central Party School’s
scientific research department, concluded from these
results, “China’s political status and influence in the
world is constantly on the rise.”29
Meanwhile, China’s influential elite see an America
that is losing some of its overwhelming advantage in
comprehensive national power (it is ranked number
one) as it pursues unpopular unilateral actions and
isolates itself from the world community. China’s
influential elite often refer to the concept of “soft power.”
This is an American concept, but one that is similar
to comprehensive national power in recognizing the
importance of economics and diplomatic cooperation
in addition to military power. The elites quote other
scholars (often American) who recount the decline in
America’s soft power. Much of this decline, as China’s
influential elite sees it, is due to the perceived trend
towards multipolarity in the world. So as China’s
stature and willingness to cooperate increase in the eyes
of other nations, and the U.S. stature and cooperation
13

declines, China’s comprehensive national power
will only continue to rise while America’s stagnates.
Chinese scholars project that these changes will occur
in the next 10 to 20 years—the period of “strategic
opportunity” for their country.
This concept of strategic opportunity is the most
important idea to grasp if we are to understand
Chinese threat perceptions. It is this idea, that there
is a brief window of opportunity in which China can
maximize its circumstances (or its shi), that makes
Chinese perceptions of threat so wide-ranging. The
Chinese government has held fast to the proposition
that “peace and development are the main themes of
the era” ever since Deng Xiaoping proclaimed it as
such in the 1980s. This enduring strategic judgment
led to the declaration from the 16th Party Congress
that the first 20 years of the 21st century are “a period
of important strategic opportunity which China must
tightly grasp and in which a lot can be achieved.”
China’s official national security concept thus stresses
capitalizing on it as much as it stresses sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and it emphasizes economic and
financial threats as much as military ones. As stated in
the 2004 Defense White Paper:
Proceeding from the fundamental interests of the country,
China’s national defense policy is both subordinated to
and in service of the country’s development and security
strategies. Firmly seizing and taking full advantage of
the important strategic opportunities presented in the first
two decades of this century, China sticks to keeping its
development in pace with its security and makes great
efforts to enhance its national strategic capabilities
by using multiple security means to cope with both
traditional and non-traditional security threats so as to
seek a comprehensive national security in the political,
economic, military, and social areas.30 (italics added)
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China’s national security concept thus is very
comprehensive. It still includes sovereignty and
territorial integrity as primary concerns. But American
intervention in the Taiwan Straits or rising dissent in the
countryside are not the only threats to China’s national
security. Anything that stands to impede the country’s
continued steady economic growth or its social and
political transformation also is considered detrimental
to China’s stability and security. Even further, any
threat to China’s “national dignity” and “status of
equality in the international community” is considered
to endanger the country’s security.31 Consequently,
perceived threats to China’s national security include
an over-dependence on foreign resources, America’s
increasing disregard for multilateralism, and China’s
own population’s inability to get past historical
disagreements with and hatred for Japan. Security is
no longer limited to issues of sovereignty and territory.
Economic and financial security and even international
prestige are now just as important.32 To be sure, China’s
influential elite say that the country is more stable and
secure than at any time in the country’s history. But
given this broad, comprehensive view about what
constitutes a threat to their nation’s security, the
Chinese have much to be concerned about.
China’s Security Situation: Traditional
and Nontraditional Threats and a Comprehensive
Security Concept to Address Them.
One member of the influential elite summarized
China’s security environment this way:
Many hotspot problems are located close to China, and
the variables in China’s peripheral environment have
increased. Objectively speaking, at present there is no
threat to China of large-scale invasion by an external
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enemy, nor will China easily become involved in
conflicts and disputes in its peripheral regions, hence,
China’s security environment can in general be described
as relatively good. However, taking a general look at
the great powers in the world today, which country is
facing such a complex and fragile peripheral security
environment as is China (Russia is the only rival); from
Kashmir and Afghanistan in the west to the Korean
peninsula in the east, and then to the South China Sea and
Taiwan strait, all the relevant problems are characterized
by being hard to resolve over a long period and also by
the possibility of breaking out at any time, and moreover
all of them are closely connected to China‘s national
security; what particularly merits attention is that “the
American factor” is behind all these problems; of course,
the existence of the American factor is not completely
negative, and in many circumstances the American
factor may be the constraining force preventing these
crises from exploding.33

According to China’s influential elite, the new
security situation—the one that has arisen since the end
of the Cold War and during China’s era of reform and
opening—has several characteristics. Many of them
are illustrated by the quotation above. First, China’s
security situation is more complex and unpredictable
than at any time in its history. While there is relative
peace and “more factors for stability than instability,”
there also are a number of complicated, intractable
problems on its periphery and a new interdependence
with the rest of the world that makes China wary.34
China has 15 neighboring countries, many of which are
still undeveloped. China’s relations with them include a
“complex interweaving of border disputes; cross-border
ethnic and religious problems, which are sure invitations to terrorism, extremism, and separatism; and the
collusions among drug-trafficking, arms-trafficking,
and transnational crimes.”35 East Asia is considered a
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region fraught with “hot spots”—including a nuclear
crisis on the Korean peninsula, simmering tensions in
Kashmir, fragile political stability in Central Asia, and
a Japan seeking “normalcy.” Almost all the members of
the world nuclear club are present in the region, not to
mention those countries that strive to possess nuclear
weapons, thus forming a “concentrated nuclear circle”
around China.36
Another factor for unease stems from China’s new
interdependence with the rest of the world as a result
of its opening up and the ramifications of globalization.
Because it still lacks a solid economic structure, China
is “vulnerable to the impact of international monopoly
capital expansion,” while its dependence on foreign
funds, technology, resources, and markets has made it
“subject to the embroilment into the outside economic
situation and the risks of manipulation and restriction
by outside forces.”37 The Director of China’s Center for
Contemporary International Relations referred to this as
China’s “reliance problems.” He adds that “China relies
quite a bit on foreign resources, on foreign markets,
on the international situation and on the security and
stability of the environment on China’s periphery, and
on domestic stability, too.”38 China cannot control the
myriad factors that may cause instability and insecurity
in the international marketplace, which contributes
to the newly challenging and unpredictable security
environment.
Another characteristic of China’s security situation
is a growing appreciation for the interconnectedness
of internal and external security. The two influence,
constrain, and permeate each other. As one of the most
preeminent members of the influential elite said, “The
factors that seriously may threaten China’s national
security are those problems that are capable of turning
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‘external worries’ into ‘internal troubles.’”39 Prior to
China’s opening, the country was relatively insulated
from the world’s geopolitical fluctuations and did
not have to consider international opinion when
formulating domestic policy. As it continues to open,
however, internal issues have increasing international
consequences and vice versa. As one scholar described
it, there is an “internationalization of China’s domestic
security” and a “domestication of international security”:40
China’s domestic policies (including its development
strategy, military strategy, nationalities policy, religious
policy, and even social system and human rights policy)
will be even more closely watched by the international
community . . . . At the same time, certain domestic
security issues not only affect domestic security and
stability but also directly impact China’s security relations
with other countries and regions involved. Examples
are the Taiwan question, the Falungong issue, religious
and ethnic contradictions, the adjustment of the national
economic structure, political reform, strategic petroleum
reserve, large projects with environmental impact, and
the development of oil and natural gas resources in
the East Asia Sea. No longer are these issues merely
domestic issues, but they also significantly constrain
the development of China’s relations with a number of
countries.41

Further, there is a growing number of factors that
pose a threat to the existence and development of
China other than traditional military threats from other
nations. There is a consensus among the elite that the
likelihood of traditional military conflict has decreased
and has been successfully managed through military
deterrence. It is the nontraditional threats such as energy
insecurity, environmental degradation, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism,
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transnational crime, drug-trafficking, piracy, and the
spread of disease that increasingly are threatening to
China due to their potential to impede progress during
China’s period of strategic opportunity. Nontraditional
security threats are thus of just as much concern, if not
more, than traditional ones, in China’s new security
environment.
Perhaps the most worrisome characteristic of
China’s current security environment is the possibility
for a confluence of traditional and nontraditional
threats. There is an oft-stated concern that traditional
and nontraditional threats will coincide or enable one
another:
In particular, we should be on guard against the possibility
that nontraditional security threats, having built up over
a long period of time and lacking an effective resolution,
may lead to military, political, and diplomatic conflicts of
the traditional variety, thus jeopardizing overall national
security. The mishandling of traditional security, in turn,
will enable unstable factors that are domestic in nature
or that exist between two countries to cross national
borders and become magnified through globalization,
becoming a nontraditional security issue for the entire
international community.42

China’s arms control White Paper also warned
of the intersection of traditional and nontraditional
threats:
The world is far from tranquil as traditional security
issues persist, local wars and violent conflicts crop up
time and again, and hot-spot issues keep emerging.
Nontraditional security threats such as terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
transnational crimes, and infectious diseases are on
the rise. The intertwined traditional and nontraditional
threats pose severe challenges to international
security.43
19

The potential for economic warfare to lead to
military warfare, or for external instability to fuel
internal instability, or for any other convergence
of traditional and nontraditional crises, is one of
the biggest threats perceived by China’s influential
elite. Such a perfect storm would threaten not only
territorial integrity and sovereignty, it would push back
economic and democratic reforms, diminish China’s
international stature, and threaten the very survival
of the Communist regime. Several of the biggest
traditional and nontraditional threats are examined
one at a time, but it is important to keep in mind that it
is the potential for them to feed one another and thus
snowball that is of the utmost concern.
The development of China’s new security concept
can be traced back to the Asian financial crisis of 1997,
a seemingly internal problem that had wide-reaching
international repercussions. It was at this time that
China began to redefine its national security concept
to include economic and financial security. The 2000
Defense White Paper advanced the policy of “mutual
trust, mutual benefit, and mutual cooperation,”
recognizing that common interests and cooperation
were the only defense against such events in the
future. The security concept was defined further in a
policy statement to an Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) forum in 2002, again emphasizing
“dialogue and cooperation as its main characteristics.”44
In addition to the concept of mutual benefit and
common development, the policy now elevated the
importance of nontraditional security: “Apart from
the traditional security fields of preventing invasion
by external enemies and safeguarding territorial
sovereignty and integrity, attention must be paid to
focusing on striking at terrorism, transnational crime,
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and other nontraditional security fields.”45 The 2004
Defense White Paper elevated nontraditional issues even
further, stating that “traditional and nontraditional
security issues are intertwined, with the latter posing a
growing threat.”46 An entire section of the White Paper
was dedicated to highlighting cooperation China has
undertaken in the nontraditional security field.
Thus, China’s “new” security concept has evolved
in response to its increasingly complex, interconnected
security environment. China’s policymakers have
determined that the only way to address such a wideranging and unpredictable panoply of traditional
and nontraditional threats is through increased
international interaction. After all, these are issues
that China cannot resolve alone or through the tried
and true method of military deterrence. This is why
China’s foreign policies focus on trust, engagement,
and cooperation to an extent never seen before.
As stated in the introduction to China’s 2004
National Defense White Paper:
A panoramic view of the present-day world displays
the simultaneous existence of both opportunities for and
challenges to peace and development, and of positive and
negative factors bearing on security and stability. The
opportunities cannot be shared and the challenges cannot
be overcome unless diverse civilizations, social systems,
and development models live together harmoniously,
trust each other, and engage in cooperation. . . .47

The White Paper goes on to declare China’s modernization during its period of strategic opportunity as the
country’s primary strategic goal:
The development goal for China to strive for in the first two
decades of this century is to build a moderately prosperous
society in an all-round way. As a large developing country,
China has before it an arduous task for modernization, which
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calls for prolonged and persistent hard work . . . . China needs
a peaceful international environment for its own development,
which in turn will enhance peace and development in the
world.48

Chinese perceptions about its security environment
are thus well-enunciated in official policy. Its policies
also make clear both China’s strategic goal—a peaceful
environment for development—and its policy for
achieving it—cooperation and engagement. There
is an array of traditional and nontraditional security
issues that threaten the realization of the strategic goal.
Policies to address such threats are focused largely
on increasing cooperation and engagement, working
together in areas of “mutual benefit,” and achieving
a “win-win” solution. There also is an important
element of military modernization in China’s national
security strategy, declaredly to deter aggression
and independence movements by Taiwan and other
“separatist forces,” as well as to assure maritime security. Since this subject receives appropriate scrutiny
elsewhere, this monograph will not attempt to treat
the extent or intent of China’s military modernization
specifically.
Rather, to reiterate, this monograph will examine the
multitude of threats to national security as perceived
by China’s influential elite. And in so doing, it will
indirectly shed some light on the intent of China’s
military modernization, as well as on the motivations
behind decisions and actions of the Chinese leadership
more broadly. Taking a distinctly Chinese perspective
will allow us to appreciate the array of traditional and
nontraditional issues that threaten to adversely affect
China’s sovereignty, continued economic and social
development, and growing influence on the world
stage. As will be seen, the threats are numerous and
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varied, while mitigating them requires cooperation,
diplomacy, and serious internal reforms. The security
environment the Chinese perceive is a complex and
dangerous one. And in order to ensure China’s security
and stability, the Chinese government has a lot of work
to do.
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CHAPTER 2
TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS
Traditional threats, while never defined precisely
by China’s influential elite, are characterized loosely as
threats to a nation emanating from other nations, and
involving a military component. To begin examining
China’s traditional security threats, it is necessary to
start with the most pervasive and enduring traditional
threat to China’s perceived territorial integrity—
Taiwan. As stated in China’s National Defense in 2004,
“The separatist activities of the ‘Taiwan independence’
forces increasingly have become the biggest immediate
threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
as well as peace and stability.”49 The subject of Taiwan
is the first talking point in any Chinese discussion of
national security. But in a 2004 survey of government
officials and experts conducted by Beijing University,
a Taiwan crisis was ranked last in a long list of
possible crises to occur before 2010.50 So while there
is considerable discussion about the Taiwan issue,
the possibility of a crisis is not likely in the minds
of China’s influential elite. As this monograph will
show, there are many other more immediate and
likely concerns for China’s influential elite to entertain.
Further, the cross-Strait situation has been analyzed
thoroughly by both Chinese and American scholars
and, except the 1996 incident, the situation has actually
been managed successfully. Thus, despite Taiwan’s
rhetorical prominence, the Taiwan issue is not the
highest concern of China’s influential elite. Given the
situation’s perceived improbability and the sufficient
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attention otherwise given to it, Taiwan will not be
covered here.
We will begin instead with the United States, which
pervades nearly all discussions of the security threats
facing China today, and which is perceived as both a
stabilizing and destabilizing factor in the region. The
results of a 2005 public opinion poll, conducted by the
Global Times with the help of the Institute of American
Studies at the China Academy of Social Sciences,
reflected both the positive and negative perceptions of
the United States held by the Chinese public. Nearly
half of the Chinese polled considered the United
States as their main rival. Almost 60 percent thought
the United States was doing its best to contain China.
Simultaneously, those polled pointed to the United
States as a model for China to learn from, admitting
that good Sino-U.S. relations have contributed to
China’s economic development.51 These results reflect
how complicated and multifaceted the Sino-U.S.
relationship is. (It also reflects the reality of the dialectic
approach that allows Chinese to be comfortable
holding multiple and conflicting viewpoints.) Because
the United States is such a prevalent force in China’s
security considerations, the threats perceived from the
United States will be considered first. We then will
turn to the most prominent and enduring regional
threats—those emanating from Japan and India. What
is common to all of these traditional adversaries is their
potential and their perceived willingness to contain
China. Interestingly, it is the threat of economic and
diplomatic containment more than the threat of
traditional military containment that is most troubling
to China’s influential elite.
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I. THE UNITED STATES: THE HEGEMONIC
THREAT
As the public opinion poll mentioned above
demonstrated, there are mixed feelings about the
United States in China. But among China’s influential
elite, there is near unanimity on one point: America’s
global strategy is hegemony. Virtually every Chinese
American scholar and news article regarding the
United States begins with this statement of perceived
fact. Below are just a few examples of this viewpoint,
from several of China’s leading America scholars:
The core content of US global strategy since the 20th
century has been to establish and consolidate its world
leadership status, or in other words, to contend for and
maintain its world hegemony status.
Liu Jianfei, Professor,
CPC Central Party School52
By analyzing the words and deeds of America’s political
leaders as well as the trends in the news media, we see
that the United States has made the maintenance of its
hegemony the goal of its global strategy now and for a
long time to come.
Ruan Zongze, Deputy Director and
Research Fellow
China Institute of International Studies53
Generally speaking, the national strategic goal of the
post-Cold War United States has been relatively stable,
that is, to maintain the U.S. “world leadership status” for
as long as possible.
Jin Canrong, Vice President and Professor
School of International Relations, Chinese
People’s University54
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The United States is the sole superpower in the postCold War world, and will be the only nation with the
capacity and the ambition to exercise global hegemony
for quite a long time to come.
Wang Jisi, former Director,
Institute of American Studies,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences55

Hegemony is a concept that permeates Chinese
thought. As far back as the Warring States period, rulers
were seeking hegemony over “all under heaven.”56 The
Chinese characters, ba quan, taken separately mean right
or authority (ba) and rule by might rather than right
(quan). The Modern Chinese English Dictionary defines
ba quan this way: in the realm of international relations,
to use force or power to control or contain another
country. It also is translated as supremacy.57 The term
is never so clearly defined when it is used by China’s
influential elite; but this definition demonstrates why
the word carries such a negative connotation. To the
Chinese, a hegemon is a country that uses force to
control or contain another country—thus interfering
in other countries’ internal affairs. Hegemonism is
to blame for China’s “century of humiliation.” Thus,
the Chinese aversion to hegemony is rooted deeply in
their historical experience and national psyche and is
not easily overcome.
The characterization of the United States as a
hegemon pervades all Chinese perceptions about
America today. From this, the Chinese influential elite
draw two conclusions about the United States. First,
they conclude that the United States feels threatened
by any country that challenges their hegemony, and
they will thus take action to contain any country that
does so. A China rising in power and influence is just
such a threat and thus the United States will act to
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contain China . . . while it still can. America’s policies
regarding China and its recent military, diplomatic,
and economic actions in East Asia all prove this point
in the eyes of the Chinese elite. The writings of their
counterparts in the United States, American China
scholars, also support the containment conclusion.
The second conclusion drawn from the hegemonic
characterization of America is that the United States
wants to continue to expand and solidify its supremacy
in the international arena. America is thus striving for
a new, America-centric world order. This is evidenced
by America’s foreign policy of promoting democracy,
unilateralism, and preemption. This threat, of a new
international order, will be examined first. Treatment of
the threat of containment will follow, as will the threat
perceived from the unpredictability and conservatism
of American politics.
The Threat to the Current World Order.
From listening carefully to what American
leaders are saying in official policy documents and
in person (through speeches, interviews, testimony,
etc.), China’s influential elite find their fears about
America’s hegemonic nature confirmed. America’s
global war on terror, commitment to spreading
democracy, and doctrine of preemption are perceived
as evidence not only of America’s intent to maintain
global predominance, but to remake the world order
with itself at the center. The current strategic balance
has provided China the opportunity to open and grow
amidst relative peace and stability; any upset to this
balance thus is considered a threat to China’s continued
development.
Many of China’s influential elite see the war on
terror as America’s current instrument to uphold and
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extend U.S. hegemony. It is under the pretext of the
war on terror that American military power extended
into Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
Liu Jianfei, professor at the CPC Central Party School,
believes the war on terror has come to be a convenient
means to reach America’s desired hegemonistic end:
“If the Afghan war was focused on fighting terrorism,
and promoting hegemony was a case of ‘incidentally
hitting a rabbit while raking the grass’, the Iraq war
was to a very great extent fought in order to promote
hegemonist strategy, and fighting terrorism and
preventing proliferation just became a pretext for
launching the war.”58
To the influential elite, the recent U.S. national
security strategies exemplify America’s intent to
redefine the international order. China’s influential
elite find the 2002 and 2006 versions threatening for two
reasons: First, the emphasis they place on spreading
democracy; and, second, the latitude they provide the
United States in acting preemptively—or, in China’s
view, interfering in other countries’ internal affairs.
The focus on democracy emphasizes the ideological
differences between the United States and China that
had decreased in significance as China’s economy
opened, and our economic interests converged. But the
Bush administration’s strategies put the issue back in
the spotlight. As Liu Jianfei observed:
Proceeding from the U.S. national security strategy,
the United States “hopes” that China can speed up its
“democratization” process, but China’s reality determines
that it cannot copy western models of democracy, and
in addition it must follow a path of gradual progress.
There is quite a bit of distance between China’s reality
and America’s “hope.” This will affect U.S. China policy
and will easily make Americans hostile toward China.59
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Wang Pufeng, a senior officer with the Academy
of Military Science, sees America’s national security
strategy as threatening because of the leeway it
provides America in invading China.
Right-wing personalities have contracted a stubborn
case of “Cold-War thinking” and “they firmly believe
that the values of China’s social system and pursuits
are fundamentally different than U.S. values.” The swift
growth of China’s economy, its abrupt political rise, and
its national defense modernization building inevitably
will influence and hinder the power and pace of the U.S.
leading the world. The way they consider China to be
a potential enemy cannot be changed. Once Sino-U.S.
relations become strained, it cannot be ruled out that the
U.S. may wantonly find an excuse and carry out a “strike
first” attack against China.60

General Wang’s concern about preemptive U.S.
military action against China is not shared widely. (His
position within the Chinese military establishment
likely explains his focus on this possibility.) Most of
the Chinese influential elite do not believe a military
attack by the United States to be likely. What they
do worry about, however, is the broader threat that
this policy poses to the international order. From
the Chinese perspective, the international order is
governed by international institutions that afford all
countries equal footing and an inalienable right to
sovereignty. It is characterized by a strategic balance
that requires multilateralism. At an experts’ forum
sponsored by the China Institute for Contemporary
International Relations in 2003, all of the participating
Chinese scholars from a wide range of research
institutes agreed: There was “change brewing in the
international order.”61 Those changes were attributed
almost exclusively to American actions. Ruan Zongze,
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representing the China Institute for International
Security, called the U.S. approach to national security
a “grim assault on and challenge to the existing
international order.” He described the assault this
way: “In the eyes of the United States, international
treaties, mechanisms, and security arrangements get
in the way of its right to act on its own. The Iraqi war
shows that the modern international order, represented
by the United Nations (UN), has become a constraint
on America’s pursuit of its single-pole strategy.”62
Gu Dexin, the director of the International Relations
Studies Office at China’s National Defense University,
believes this negation of existing international norms
rises to a “U.S. strategic concept,” which he termed the
“sole hegemonist” strategy. Instead of the UN-centered
system, the United States is pursuing a new security
structure with itself at its center. In this new structure,
cooperation would revolve around the United States
and its “mission-based” alliances.63 It is “a so-called
security system based on a coalition of the willing.”64
This American quest for a new security construct
also was enunciated by then U.S. National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice at a speech she gave in 2003
at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in
London. While her words in English did not carry this
meaning, Wang Yusheng’s translation of her remarks
had Rice urging everyone to “lay aside the quest for
a multiplicity of new ‘poles’ and unite within the
sphere of America’s ‘one pole’ of freedom, peace, and
justice.”65
While American policies promoting democracy,
unilateralism, preemption, and the war on terror are
not policies directed against China (in fact, one could
argue China hardly is even considered when making
these decisions), from a Chinese perspective, they are
a threat. That holistic Eastern perspective described by
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Nisbett seems an apt explanation for this perception.
China has staked its continued development to the
current multipolar, cooperative, peaceful, international
order. It is within this current international order that
China found relative stability, comfort, and room
to pursue both its economic modernization and an
increasing role in the international arena. The U.S.
strategies of unilateralism and preemption threaten
to destabilize this system, producing unpredictability
for China’s security environment.66 Thus, U.S. national
security doctrine not only confirms U.S. hegemonic
intent, it threatens the international balance of power
on which China’s continued stability, growth, and
rising international stature depend.
The Threat of Containment and the
“China Threat Theory.”
China’s influential elite coined a phrase that is
used regularly in their writings, capturing both the
American suspicion of a rising China and Chinese
suspicion of American containment efforts: the
“China threat theory.” Calling it a theory indicates
that the influential elite believe it is not a reality but
a hypothesis, concocted and propagated to breed fear
and mistrust about China’s intentions. While Japan is
sometimes credited with creating the theory initially,
China’s influential elite attribute the theory’s recent
resurgence to the United States. “The United States
has whipped up an evil wave of the ‘China threat
theory’ domestically and internationally, which has
caught the widespread attention of the international
community,” wrote Qian Wenrong in the journal
published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.67 Chinese
publications describe the theory as one that has been
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around since the Cold War, but its prominence ebbs
and flows depending on the international situation and
changes in Sino-U.S. relations. An editorial in a journal
for mid-level party officials noted, “The new round
of the ‘China threat theory’ bore down menacingly
early this year, and it has gradually intensified,
turning into the most ‘all-round’ anti-China wave in
the United States since the end of the Cold War.”68 The
reason cited for the theory’s resurgence varies. Some
attribute it to “antiterrorism fatigue,” while others
blame the influence of neoconservatives on the current
administration.69 Regardless of its origins, the spread
of the China threat theory in itself is a threat to China.
The China threat theory is menacing to China
for several reasons. First, the “theory” may gain
traction, allowing the United States to define the
world’s perceptions of China as an aggressor, instead
of the image that Beijing is working assiduously to
promote of a China as a peaceful, cooperative, and
responsible international partner. If the theory is
believed, China’s recent diplomatic drive to build
trust and cooperation—through ASEAN, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, the Six Party talks—would
be impeded. China’s neighbors, already suspicious
of China’s intentions in the region, would only grow
more wary, setting back substantial progress made
in resolving historical border disputes and lingering
grievances. The vigor with which China’s “peaceful
development” has been promoted (it even merited a
Chinese government White Paper in December 2005)
demonstrates the importance the Central Government
has attached to countering the theory of the China
threat. The promise that “China will unswervingly
follow the road of peaceful development” is an
unequivocal response to American and international
concerns about a threatening China.70
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Second, if this aggressive image of China takes hold,
then China becomes the strategic rival of the United
States. This is not a role in which China wants to be
cast because it means that America will, in its classic
Cold War fashion, take whatever actions are necessary
to contain and defeat China. The influential elite often
refer to this threat of the “Cold War mentality” and
the danger it poses with its outmoded, zero-sum
assumptions.71
While most of China’s influential elite recognize
that America’s China policy is a mixture of both
containment and engagement, their concern is that
a spreading China threat theory affects that mixture,
leading the United States to enact more policies
of containment and less of engagement. This fear
is confirmed as China’s influential elite look to (1)
American policy statements; (2) military, diplomatic,
and economic actions that the United States has taken
recently; and (3) American academia. The view of each
of these from the influential elite’s perspective will be
examined in turn.
America’s China Policy—Proof of the Threat Theory’s
Strength. While the broader U.S. national security
policies of unilateralism and preemption are seen as
evidence that America’s grand strategy is hegemony,
policies, and statements relating specifically to China
demonstrate that there is not such a clearly defined and
coherent China-specific strategy. Because the United
States lacks a clear and consistent policy regarding
China, the influential elite watch official speeches,
statements, and reports closely to determine just what
U.S. policy toward China is or will be. What they see is
substantial proof that U.S. policymakers have widely
accepted the “theory of the China threat.” What is so
frustrating to China’s influential elite is the lack of
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evidence on which the widespread acceptance of the
China threat theory is based.
Former Secretary Rumsfeld’s June 2005 speech to
the Asian Security Conference in Singapore often is
cited as an example of the threat theory’s dissemination
and acceptance by America. In China’s backyard, to an
audience of its neighbors, Secretary Rumsfeld labeled
China’s military buildup “a concern,” questioning
whether China really was facing any threats that
would justify its military modernization.72 To a country
surrounded by fledgling states, historical invaders,
nuclear powers, and in addition grappling with issues
of terrorism and proliferation just as the United States
is, this remark was considered insulting by Chinese
news media and thinkers.
Another American policy considered rather
insulting by China’s influential elite is the publication
of the Pentagon’s Annual Report to Congress: The Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China. The existence of
this report is the most widely referenced example of the
propagation of the China threat theory and is credited
in both scholarly writing and the news media for the
theory’s “comeback.”73 The report, which is mandated
by Congress and has been published yearly since
2000, analyzes China’s military modernization and
spending. The report submitted to Congress in July
2005 found that the “pace and scope” of China’s military
modernizations is “ambitious” while its motivations
are unknown.74 The report concluded that China is at a
“strategic crossroads”—facing a choice between a path
of “peaceful integration and benign competition” with
the world or a less peaceful, more aggressive one.75 The
2006 Report, submitted to Congress a short 8 months
later, again commented that “China’s leaders have
yet to adequately explain the purposes of desired end
states of their military expansion.”76
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That the report is written at all is seen as evidence
of American’s adherence to outdated and dangerous
Cold War thinking, trying to paint China as the
strategic rival that the Soviet Union once was. Major
General Peng Guangqian of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences
noted that there have been only two instances where
a government has publicly published reports on the
military power of another country: the U.S. reports on
the military strength of the former Soviet Union, and
the current reports to Congress on China’s military
strength. He continues, “Cooking up this kind of report
on the military power of the so-called major opponent
or potentially major ‘challenger’ of the future reflects
typical Cold War thinking.”77 While the report is no
different from a standard intelligence assessment on
foreign capabilities that most countries produce, its
unclassified nature and broad distribution does make
it unique. And the fact that the United States does
not publish such assessments on any country besides
China is telling about our own threat perceptions.
Beyond the report’s publication, China’s
government finds the content of the report to be an
unfounded and unwarranted exaggeration of their
military modernization. Beijing’s official response to the
2005 report, delivered by Vice Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi, was that the report “groundlessly criticizes”
China’s defense modernization and seriously violates
“basic norms governing international relations.”78 The
official response in 2006 was similar. Commenting on
the Pentagon’s “Cold War mentality” and continued
propagation of the “China threat theory,” China’s
Foreign Ministry spokesman noted that China was
“strongly resentful and firmly opposed” to the report.79
In light of America’s own military strength and
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considerable defense spending, the report is viewed as
an exaggeration. Major General Peng commented that
the report “has more subjectivity than objectivity, more
illusions than facts, and more bias than rationality.”80
The Chinese influential elite look at the technological
and budgetary superiority of the U.S. military and
question how America can possibly feel threatened by
China.
The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s
newspaper, makes the following comparison about
defense spending in an article titled “Pentagon’s ‘China
Threat’ Paranoia”: China’s military expenditure was
about $25.5 billion in 2004, while the U.S. figure was
$455.9 billion, 17.8 times that of China or 77 times on a
per capita basis. China defends a territory largely the
same size as the United States with military spending 6
percent that of the United States. How can China pose
a threat to the US?”81 The numbers are broken down
in a variety of ways, all of which demonstrate the vast
disparity between military spending in China and the
United States. One compares the amount of money
spent per square kilometer: China spends $2,645 per
square kilometer on defense, while the United States
spends $52,000. Another comparison: China spends
$11,374 per service member, while the United States
spends $350,000 per service member. 82 These numbers
imply a degree of precision that cannot be confirmed;
the exact amount China spends on national defense
is not available publicly.83 The point, however, is still
valid: The United States spends far more on defense
than China does—and will continue to do so, even as
China’s defense spending increases.
Another legitimate and oft-made distinction between the U.S. military and China’s is the disparities in
overseas troop deployments and military technological
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advances. As an editorial in the People’s Daily pointed
out,
The United States has troops stationed in well over 130
countries and regions and several hundred overseas
military bases; while China does not have a single soldier
stationed overseas. . . . The U.S. Army has realized
mature mechanization and has initially completed
information-oriented transformation; while the Chinese
Army is far away from having gone through the road to
mechanization, and it has just taken the first step toward
information-oriented construction.84

It is such disparities in money, intent, and capabilities—in addition to the existence of the Report to
Congress—that lead the Chinese to conclude that the
United States is “paranoid” for buying into the “theory
of the China threat,” and is stuck in an outdated Cold
War mentality. The “only military superpower in the
world” cannot truly feel threatened by a less capable,
technologically inferior force.85 Thus, China’s influential
elite conclude that there must be another reason for
America’s declared concern about China. The Chinese
news media offer several possible explanations for the
publication of the Pentagon’s Report to Congress. One
perceived explanation: it is part of a plan to foment
dissent and anti-Chinese sentiment in the Asia Pacific in
order to maintain American power in the region. Other
explanations are more profit-oriented. For instance, a
modernizing Chinese military provides justification for
continued and increasing arms sales to Taiwan as well
as continued development of theater missile defense.
Yet others point to the report and the “threat theory”
as U.S. justification for intervention in China’s affairs,
for instance in negotiations for arms sales to China by
the European Union (EU) and Israel.86

39

Surely the intent of the report is hardly so nefarious;
the real reason it is published is the congressional
requirement to do so. And Congress and the Pentagon
certainly have reason to be concerned about China’s
growing military power and the lack of transparency
in its motivations and intentions. But Chinese reaction
to the report and to American concern over the socalled China threat also is understandable. As they
are quick to point out in a variety of ways, America
has an overwhelming military advantage and is more
inclined to utilize it. To Americans, the Pentagon’s
report provides evidence of the China threat. To the
Chinese, the report serves as proof of an American
Cold War mentality and paranoia—a mindset that not
only threatens further efforts to modernize the Chinese
military but threatens to place the country in direct
opposition to and competition with the United States
for world status and state survival.
Because China’s influential elite pays close attention
to U.S. policymaking regarding China, they understand
that the Pentagon report is not a complete reflection of
U.S. policy toward China. Elements of both containment
and engagement exist, depending on American
interests. China’s influential elite commonly refer to
this combination of containment and engagement as
“hedging.” Most recently, the influential elite have
paid particular attention to a speech given by former
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, which
leaned toward engagement. Titled “Whither China:
From Membership to Responsibility,” the speech
urged China to become a “responsible stakeholder”
in the international system.87 A rather vigorous and
sophisticated discussion about just what this speech
meant ensued in China. It has since gained traction in
both American and Chinese policy. Whether the United

40

States and China agree on what exactly it means to be a
“responsible stakeholder” is yet to be seen.
Since America’s China policy is such a confusing
and contradictory mix of containment and engagement,
China’s influential elite also look to just how these
policies are implemented. Unfortunately, American
actions are perceived as even more threatening than
declared policy.
American Actions—Speaking Louder than Words. To
the influential elite, the exaggeration of the China threat
and the move to contain China evident in U.S. policy
are confirmed in American actions. The changing force
disposition of the U.S. military, the diplomatic efforts
the United States has made in the Asia Pacific region,
and the political interference allowed in economic
affairs all validate China’s perception that the United
States is seeking to contain China.
Militarily, changes to United States force disposition
lead the Chinese influential elite to conclude that the
United States is shifting its focus to the Asia Pacific
region. The American military physically surrounds
China, with troops in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Japan,
and Korea. Qian Wenrong, in the journal published by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described U.S. military
activity in the Asia Pacific this way:
The United States has taken further steps to build an
even tighter strategic ring of encirclement in China’s
neighboring regions. Over the past more than 1 year,
the United States has significantly strengthened its
network of military bases in the Asia Pacific region
and its alliance relationship with China’s neighboring
countries; further strengthened the U.S. Pacific Fleet;
and established forward military bases in Central Asia,
which is contiguous to China’s Western region, in the
name of counterterrorism.88
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Further, the United States is expanding its military
cooperation with Japan as the two countries redefine
their strategic security agreement. This compounds the
perceived threat posed by a militarily resurgent and
increasingly nationalistic Japan. (Threat perceptions
relating to Japan are addressed in the next chapter.)
The buildup of theater missile defense (another
example of military cooperation with Japan) also
is seen as an effort to contain China. Xin Benjian, an
instructor at the PLA Foreign Language College,
wrote in Contemporary International Relations that the
Americans and Japanese have “reached consensus
on the excuse (guarding against Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea [DPRK]) and real cause (China) of
deploying theater missile defense (TMD) and already
have begun joint research and development of the
system.”89
America’s growing diplomatic engagement in the
region also is seen as an effort to contain China. Most
threatening is the strengthened alliance with Japan,
which for the first time engaged in the Taiwan debate,
agreeing with the United States to treat the defense
of Taiwan as their “common strategic objective.”90
Strengthened relations with Australia, Thailand,
the Philippines, Vietnam, and India also are seen
by China’s news media and scholars as part of the
containment plan. The involvement of the United States
in dissuading the EU from lifting its arms embargo and
discouraging Israel and Ukraine from selling weapons
to China is yet another example of American efforts to
spread the China threat theory and contain China.
The actions that the United States has taken in
the economic realm are most convincing to China’s
influential elite that American policy is more concerned with containing than engaging China. As Yu
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Yongsheng notes, “Economically, from crude treatment
of the textiles dispute to exerting strong pressure
for yuan revaluation, and to excessive concern over
Chinese enterprises buying American businesses,
each drip reflects the U.S. strategic intention to guard
against and contain China.”91 The pressure to revalue
the RMB and the restrictions on trade are not new to
Sino-U.S. economic negotiations. But the extent of
political involvement in the so-called free marketplace
is new. Congress recently passed a foreign aid bill with
provisions that ban U.S. banks from granting loans to
American companies that build nuclear power plants
in China.92 Both houses passed resolutions preventing
the sale of Unocal to China’s National Offshore Oil
Corporation. Fu Mengzi commented on the impact—
and irony—of these actions: “Ordinary Chinese people
see a business environment full of hostility in a country
which advocates a free market.”93
These actions seemingly to constrain China’s
economic growth are perhaps the most threatening
of all of America’s policies and actions. They signal to
China’s influential elite that slowing China’s economic
rise is how U.S. policymakers will pursue containment.
One American scholar (John Mearsheimer, discussed
below), who is outside of the government and arguably
has minimal direct influence over official U.S. policy,
has been a vociferous advocate of just such a policy of
economic containment. Such thinking outside of official
government channels is seen by China’s influential elite
as mainstream acceptance of the China threat theory
and of the containment policy. China’s influential elite
devote considerable time and effort to understanding
their American peers for this reason. An examination
of what the influential elite of China see when they
look at America’s influential elite follows.
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Proof from Peers. It is interesting to note the
frequency with which China’s influential elite turn to
their American counterparts and cite them as evidence
of what the Chinese assume is the U.S. leadership’s
intent and motivation. It may be an indicator of the
significant influence the Chinese elite have on their
own leaders.
That there are voices outside of the government that
opine about the threat of China is construed as highly
relevant by China’s influential elite. It is evidence that
the “theory of the China threat” has gained intensity
and validation in mainstream America. “Whereas
the previous clamors about the ‘China threat theory’
mainly came from non-mainstream figures, this
time round we can find the voices of mainstream
figures, from Congress to government, from the
nongovernmental sector organizations to the news
media, and from academic circles to think tanks,”
observes Yu Yongsheng.94 Fu Mengzi, writing in World
Affairs, also sees who is talking about the China threat
as evidence of its strength. He notes that the “creators
and supporters of the new round of the ‘China threat
theory’” come from a wide range of think tanks,
interest groups, university scholars, and individuals in
the Pentagon. “Their number is considerable . . . and
they are continually expanding.”95 Yu concludes that
such a wide array of theory proponents means that a
push for containment policies will be very strong.
A U.S. scholar who receives an inordinate amount of
attention from Chinese scholars is John Mearsheimer,
a professor at the University of Chicago. As a political
scientist who has spent his career in academia, without
experience in an official government capacity and with
less exposure in American mainstream news media
than he seems to receive in China, Mearsheimer’s
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name may be more widely known in that country
than in the United States. He is the originator of the
school known as “offensive realism,” believing that
“the ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize
its share of world power and eventually dominate
the system”—in other words, to become a hegemon.96
From this theory, Mearsheimer concluded that China
and the United States are “destined to be adversaries”
as China will try to dominate Asia the way the United
States dominates the Western Hemisphere.97 Thus,
the United States should not act to engage China (a
“misguided” policy), but act to contain—and weaken—
China. In his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
Mearsheimer argued: “A wealthy China would not be
a status quo power but an aggressive state determined
to achieve regional hegemony . . . so it is not too late for
the United States to reverse course and do what it can
to slow the rise of China.”98
Mearsheimer thereby validates both of the Chinese
perceptions about the United States: (1) the United
States seeks hegemony (because all states do), which
means (2) the United States seeks containment of
China. And containment, according to Mearsheimer,
is not achieved through military policies, but through
economic ones: “The United States has a profound
interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow
considerably in the years ahead.” It is this—the
threat to its continued economic modernization and
development—that concerns China the most.99
Robert Kaplan, author and essayist, is another
civilian commentator referenced frequently by both
the state news media and the scholarly elite. The story
he published in the June 2005 issue of Atlantic Monthly,
“How We Would Fight China,” is considered one of
the most overt propagations of the China threat theory.
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Zhang Jiye and Chen Wenxin summarized the article
by saying that Kaplan, “in all apparent seriousness,
claimed that China would be a more powerful military
opponent to the United States than the [former] Soviet
Union.”100 The refrain, “in all apparent seriousness,”
goes to show the extent to which they believe the China
threat is simply a theory.
In true dialectic fashion, Chinese authors also find
voices within the American academic community
that are not proponents of the China threat theory.
Tao Jiyi, a professor at Jinan University, wrote: “At
the same time that the right-wing conservative forces
are exaggerating the ‘China threat,’ the United States
actually has a number of fair-minded scholars who
consistently refute and rebut the ‘China threat’ theory
so prevalent in U.S. society.”101 China’s scholars often
remind their readers of Joseph Nye’s 1995 warning,
“If we see China as an enemy, China actually may
become one.”102 Nye, who was serving in the Pentagon
when he issued that warning, continues in academia
today to take not only the military, but the economic
and political arenas, into consideration when assessing
China. He is an advocate for engagement with China
and thus is often referenced by Chinese scholars.
Zbigniew Brezinski, Henry Kissinger, and Samuel
Huntington also are commonly cited. Labeled realists
by Zhang Liping, a Chinese expert on American
politics, they also are seen as American scholars who
refute the China threat theory. Their belief in power
politics supports the perception that America’s goal
is hegemony, but they also focus less on ideology and
the spread of democracy and conclude that China is
not a threat to the current balance of power. Thus, they
represent the middle road between neoconservatives
like Mearsheimer and liberalists like Nye, advocating
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a combination of containment and engagement (or the
“hedging” policy).103
It is important to note that this ability to point
out more conciliatory, pro-engagement scholars is
representative of the dialectic approach taken by many
of China’s scholars. The concerns about containment
raised by China’s influential elite, validated by
American policies, actions, and academic theorizing,
often are balanced with more optimistic assessments.
While many of the elite fret about the possibility of
containment, they also conclude that the Sino-U.S.
relationship is better than ever, and there is more
opportunity for cooperation than ever before.
Another feature common to the assessments of
China’s influential elite is the rather comprehensive
perspective they take when examining U.S. policies,
actions, and academic statements. All of the statements
made by American government officials and academics
and all of the military, political, and economic actions
taken are seen by China’s influential elite as part of a
broad-based U.S. effort to contain China. As Nisbett’s
research indicated, Americans likely see all of these
events as individual incidents, with little consideration
or appreciation for how they bear upon one another.
The Chinese, on the other hand, are inclined to see
them as all interrelated components of a big picture.
From a holistic perspective, it is easier to understand
how China can perceive the United States as a threat
to their national security, peaceful development, and
place in the world.
This comprehensive perspective also provides the
influential elite an appreciation of other forces at work
in the American policymaking community—such as
politics. It is to their understanding of the U.S. political
realm and the threats it poses that we will now turn.

47

The Threat of American Politics.
The attention China’s influential elite pays to
American politics and the understanding of its effects
on policymaking is notable. David Shambaugh, the
foremost American expert on Chinese perceptions
of the United States, asserted that China’s America
watchers between 1972 and 1990 did not understand
the United States very well. Their analyses were
“shallow” and lacked “subtlety and sophistication.”104
This is no longer the case. Chinese America-watchers
today recognize that there are varying schools of U.S.
political thought and that the degree of influence these
schools have on policymaking depends on the party in
power, politics, and public opinion. They understand
that the Defense Department, Congress, interest
groups, and even the military-industrial complex have
competing priorities and agendas, and that, along
with the 4-year political cycle, all have an effect on
U.S. policy toward China. They understand that our
pluralist society encourages a vast marketplace of
ideas and they look to their counterparts, U.S. China
scholars, and to public opinion in order to understand
the marketplace’s broad array of ideas about China.
They understand that all of these forces make it difficult
for the United States to adopt a long-term, coherent,
and broad “China strategy”—and most believe these
forces are the reason the United States ends up with a
“vacillating” and even “self-contradictory” muddle of
policies, some of which promote cooperation and trade
with China, and some of which stifle it.105
The influence of politics on U.S. policy is not
itself perceived as threatening to the Chinese. The
threatening aspects of American politics are the upand-down unpredictability of the political cycle and
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the increasing influence of neoconservatives and
“hawkish” forces that are perceived to have a foothold
in the highest echelons of decisionmaking, especially
at the Pentagon. And because American politics is so
unstable and unpredictable, many of the influential
elite worry that the neocon influence, with its prodemocracy, preemptive, and anti-China agenda, could
continue to increase.
The Threat of the “Neocon.”
There are generally three schools of American
political thought identified by Chinese scholars: the
hardline, “hawkish,” “neocon” influence that advocates
preemption,
unilateralism,
democracy-building,
and containment of China; the globalist, left-leaning
“liberalist” position that advocates engagement with
China; and a middle-of-the-road “realist” position
which advocates a combination of these two. It is the
neocons, their demonstrated power within the Bush
administration, and their potential for future influence
that Chinese perceive to be the most threatening. As
scholar Jin Canrong stated, “There has always been a
struggle between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ in U.S. diplomacy,
but it is extremely rare for the ‘hawks’ to hold such a
prominent position and have such great influence in
the society as they do in the Bush authorities.” 106 It is
the neoconservatives who are credited with America’s
increasing “reliance on military force and the adoption
of preemptive tactics.” Naturally, therefore “the
neoconservatives and their thinking which dominate
the Bush authorities’ strategic readjustment” evoke
particular concern. 107
Chinese scholars are in agreement that the influence
neoconservatives have exercised on America’s China
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policy is considerable. Ruan Zongze, a scholar who
participated in the 2003 Contemporary International
Relations Expert Forum on “Assessment of U.S. Global
Strategy,” noted that “the rise of neoconservatism is
an important factor shaping U.S. domestic and foreign
policies.”108 Wang Jisi, one of the most influential
Chinese America scholars, given his tenure as Director
of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, concluded that “conservative forces
represented by Republican hardliners are at the apex
of their power.”109 Zhang Liping, who conducted
a thorough study of the ideological influences that
shape U.S. China policy, described neoconservatives
as “nationalists and ideologists, convinced that the
U.S. values of liberty and democracy are the best in the
world.” Their emphasis on ideology makes them “antiChina, anticommunist,” a position that Zhang believes
puts the United States and China on an inevitable
collision course.110
Neoconservatives also are considered threatening
by China’s influential elite because of the perceived
influence they have exercised in the Defense Department. This is where Chinese scholars find the highest
concentration of “Cold War thinking”—the containment
philosophy that is the “trademark of American hawks”
and a hallmark of neoconservative thought.111 We
should note, of course, that with the U.S. November
2006 election returns and the resignations of Rumsfeld,
Doug Feith, and Paul Wolfowitz from the Pentagon’s
top echelon, the neocon influence may be waning.
The reports published by the Defense Department
on China’s military strength, which the elite believe
exaggerates Chinese military power and the threat it
poses to the United States, and the Nuclear Posture
Review, which they see as lowering the threshold for
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tactical nuclear use, are indications to the Chinese of
the extent to which the hardline, neocon influence has
pervaded the Pentagon in the past.
The potential for further neoconservative influence—and hence more anti-China policies—has been
reduced by the Republican Party’s loss of control of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate
in the November 2006 elections, but a Republican
administration remains. Wang Jisi perceived the
broader effects of Republican control: “The influence
of monopoly consortium corporations on economic
policy, the influence of military industry interest
groups on national defense policy, the influence of
the right wing on ideology and political life, and the
influence of so-called ‘neocon’ hardliners on policy.”112
All of these factors are problematic for improved U.S.China relations.
From a Chinese perspective, big corporations can
adversely affect the U.S. economic policy toward
China, for instance, in promoting protectionist policies
that do not allow Chinese products to compete or
pushing currency revaluation onto the agenda. The
military-industrial complex, in pursuing profit and
budget allocations, also can negatively impact U.S.China relations. Defense contractors and the military
services stand to gain a greater share of the Defense
Department’s budget if China is considered a strategic
rival. PLA Major General Peng Guangqian noted in
an interview in July 2005 that “exaggerating China’s
military power and regarding China as a strategic
opponent can stimulate the research and development
of U.S. military industrial enterprises and win highprofit orders for U.S. military industrial enterprises.”113
The military complex also has a profit interest in selling
arms and military technology to Taiwan—putting a
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long-term strain on the U.S.-China relationship.114 The
ideological, human rights, democracy-promoting forces
in U.S. politics also can create friction between the United
States and China by forcing China’s nondemocratic
practices onto the agenda. Interest groups such as
“AFL-CIO, human rights interest groups, right-wing
Christians . . . latch onto certain problems in Sino-U.S.
relations to create some noise.”115 So the greater the
impact that the corporate, military, and human rights
interest groups have on U.S. policymaking, the more
threatened China feels.
Unpredictability: The Threat of the American Political
Cycle. Chinese news media and scholars appreciate
the ebb and flow of U.S. politics and find that, in
the long term, American politics has a tendency to
moderate itself. But the short-term political cycle
often is destabilizing: “It often happens that when
government power in the United States passes from
one party to another, there is quite a long period of
instability in Sino-U.S. relations.”116 The influential
elite correlate this instability with the cyclical nature
of American politics. Zhang Liping, a U.S. expert at the
China Academy of Social Sciences, believes that the
ups and downs of Sino-U.S. relations track the cycle of
presidential power shifts. She described the cycle this
way:
Because of the cycle of electoral politics, when a new
president comes to power, he always inclines to show
differences of policy, distinguished from the former
president. This is done out of the purpose of keeping
the promises made in the campaign and rewarding the
supporters and consolidating his political base. It is
done also for the sake of clarifying his political ideas.
Generally speaking, the first year can be termed the
“intern year,” particularly for a new president who lacks
in the diplomatic experience and cannot understand the
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complex[ity] of Sino-U.S. relations . . . The second and
third years can be called “the window of opportunity”
to improve the relations between China and the US.
During the period, the new president feels at home in the
White House and has accumulated some sense through
the summits. Now that his appointees have filled the
positions, he has access to information necessary to
decisionmaking. He then has a leeway power in handling
foreign policy. In the 4th year of the term, the president
has become “lame duck,” and he has fewer resources to
take the risky and aggressive maneuver. The president
who wants to campaign for reelection sometimes makes
“irrational” policy. As the head of the political party, he
must defend his policy and try to leave nothing wrong
for the challenging party to blame.117

Dr. Zhang’s concern is that “the window of
opportunity to make sound U.S.-China policy does not
open wide frequently.”118 In an interview, Dr. Zhang
admitted that the reelection of George W. Bush in 2004
was better for Sino-U.S. relations than the election
of John Kerry would have been. Bush’s reelection
eliminated the destabilizing effects of the “intern year”
and opened wider the window of opportunity.119
This perspective on American presidential politics
is interesting. While few Americans would consider
China a major political issue and would hardly cast a
vote dependent solely on a candidate’s China policy,
Chinese scholars examine candidate rhetoric regarding
China carefully and conclude that anti-China rhetoric
often is “a trick used by politicians of the two major
parties to win votes” in the run-up to a presidential
election.120
In the long run, however, the Chinese elite find that
the political cycle allows for stabilization of U.S.-China
relations and a move toward the middle, away from
extremes on either end of the political spectrum: “The
United States is a country with a fairly strong capability
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to regulate itself.”121 In keeping with their dialectical
approach to analysis, after sounding the alarm about
neoconservatives and the political cycle, the Chinese
influential elite also recognize the limitations on these
factors. For example, Ruan Zongze noted that “despite
the sound and fury of neoconservatism, already there
are signs it is overextended.”122 Tao Wenzhao, a U.S.
expert at China’s Academy of Social Sciences, wrote
an article in a Hong Kong paper chronicling the
“downhill” trend of neoconservatism of late. But he
ended by warning that such political thinking still has
influence; thus “we must keep our vigilance.”123 While
Zhang Liping noted how threatening neoconservative
thought was toward China, she also concluded that
“neoconservatism is too extreme, too belligerent,
and too inoperable in international political practice.
. . . Thus, Bush’s policy will continue to curb its
influence.”124 Zhang believes the liberalists, who tend
to promote engagement with China, and the realists,
who tend to promote containment toward China, will
continue to balance U.S. policy toward her country.
American public opinion also is seen by Chinese as
a force for moderation in the long run, but something
that can be unpredictable and manipulated in the short
run. Several Chinese authors concluded that it was the
fear generated in the public by the September 11, 2001
(9-11), terrorist attacks that allowed neoconservatives
greater latitude in the administration and the
opportunity to pursue policies of preemption and
military force. Shi Yinhong, a prominent Chinese
thinker, remarked that, in light of the nationwide
security panic triggered by the terrorist attacks . . . the
American public have so far given near ‘carte blanche’
support to an administration that . . . embraces an
‘offense-minded’ . . . concept of international politics
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as well as strong nationalist, unilateralist, and even
militaristic sentiments.”125 Jin Canrong, professor at
China’s People’s University, observed both the longterm moderating effects of public opinion and how it
can shift in the short-term, depending on events: “As a
pluralist society, it is relatively difficult to get the (U.S.)
public facing outward and to rally the whole country
. . . the neoconservatives can succeed for a time in
using people’s fear of terrorism to write preemptive
strike into U.S. global strategy, but in the end this will
be in contradiction to the long-standing U.S. tradition
of having the enemy strike first.”126
The consensus among Chinese thinkers and most
news media is that while neoconservative, hardline
forces that advocate containment of China do yield
influence in American politics, the moderating forces
of liberals, realists, and public opinion temper this
influence. They recognize that with “the variety
of political power centers in the United States, the
government’s stance is always greatly constrained
by other forces in society,” and there is “a very
big difference between the strategy sought by the
government and the strategy actually carried out.”127
But they also recognize that if the party in power, public
opinion, and the political cycle all tend toward an antiChina, pro-democracy, pro-human rights, preemptive,
containment philosophy, the threat to China’s economic
modernization and peaceful development during its
time of strategic opportunity could be significant.
Concluding Thought: Knowing Your Enemy.
Sun Tzu’s most famous pearl of wisdom is: “Know
the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you
will never be in peril.”128 If the Chinese take this to be

55

true today—and the countless journal articles paying
tribute to the revered ancient strategist indicate that
they do—their knowledge of the United States is an
indication that it is a threat. In contrast to Americans’
limited knowledge of Chinese history, culture, and
political decisionmaking, China’s influential elite
demonstrate a comprehensive, in-depth, and carefully
considered understanding of these aspects of America.
Of course, our limited knowledge of China is not our
fault alone. Chinese opacity and secrecy about their
political system and their limited freedom of the press
make understanding them much more difficult.
Chinese understanding of the United States has not
always been so thorough, either. The sophistication
of their understanding has emerged only in the last
decade or so, likely an outcome of burgeoning cultural
exchanges and a significant population of Chinese
scholars studying in the United States. An excellent
example demonstrating this knowledge of the United
States is an article written by Colonel Ren Ziangqun, a
researcher at the Military Science College. His article,
“The Influence of Mainstream Cultural Traditions on
U.S. War Decisions,” explored American Puritanism,
pragmatism, and social Darwinism, demonstrating
a nuanced and studied understanding of the role of
religion, enterprise, and individuality in American
culture that could be gained only through spending
time in the country and attempting to understand the
world through our eyes (which, as a reminder, is what
we are trying to do here with respect to China).129
The attention to American policy statements and
maneuverings evident in the previous section and the
understanding of political realities and the span of the
political spectrum further exemplify the understanding
that the influential elite have of the United States.
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The United States is a factor in all of China’s security
considerations—be it regarding Taiwan, Japan, or
issues of proliferation or terrorism. Because the
“American factor” is so pervasive, it makes sense to
pay close attention to it.130 But the fact that China’s
influential elite “knows” the United States, especially
compared to Japan or India, both of which also pose a
threat (and will be examined in turn), is an important
indicator of where the United States ranks in China’s
national security concerns.
While the United States technically falls into the
“traditional” threat category, its military force is not
what is perceived as most threatening to China’s
national security. To be sure, America’s overwhelming
military power is feared by China, and much of its
military modernization is intended to deter the United
States from bringing its military power to bear. But
China’s influential elite are less concerned about a direct
military confrontation threatening China’s sovereignty
than they are concerned about the possibility of
containment. Moreover, the threat of containment is less
of a military threat and more of a diplomatic, political,
and economic one. America’s perceived desire for a
U.S.-centric world order threatens the relatively stable
international environment in which China has been
allowed to flourish. It also puts China’s growing stature
and influence on the international stage at risk. In effect,
this is the threat of diplomatic containment. But most
worrisome is economic containment—impeding or
reversing China’s foremost strategic goal of continued
growth and development. The only way for China to
mitigate this threat of containment is by debunking
the China threat theory through improved Sino-U.S.
engagement. The American political arena makes
this difficult, though. Its short-term, unpredictable,
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and cyclic nature makes it hard to devise a coherent,
long-term China strategy, while the power it affords
neoconservatives makes American opinion susceptible
to the threat theory. Thus, American domestic political
dynamics, international diplomatic influence, and
overall economic might all work toward containment of
China, imperiling its economic and social development.
It is no wonder that China’s influential elite “know”
American politics, culture, business, and international
relations so well. For this is from where the American
threat emanates.
II. THE THREAT FROM JAPAN
While much scholarly study in China has produced
a nuanced understanding of and appreciation for the
American political system, the same cannot be said of
the Chinese influential elite’s consideration of Japan.
Their perceptions of Japan are colored by a strong and
deep-rooted emotional loathing and an unwillingness
to forget historical wrongdoings. Chinese perceptions
of Japan are formed almost exclusively by the news
media, according to opinion polls. Thus the influential
elite are indeed influential. But the opinions of the
influential elite are far less monolithic when it comes
to Japan. Think tankers and academics have tried
to pursue “new thinking” about Japan, proposing
new ideas to strengthen the relationship and get
past historical issues. But the newspapers, bloggers,
and Chinese public reacted vehemently to such new
thinking, seriously criticizing the ideas and the authors
who proposed them. As a result, the public’s vitriolic
attitude toward Japan and the Chinese newspapers’
encouragement of such emotionality have hamstrung
the government’s ability to pursue rapprochement with
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Japan. Thus, it is interesting that the threat Japan poses
to China may have as much to do with China itself as it
does with Japan. While China’s public and news media
propaganda will cite rising militarism, nationalism,
and an inability to learn from history as the threat that
Japan poses, this author believes the biggest threat to
China is its own inability to manage the public’s outrage
over Japan. This inability could have several adverse
consequences: a cooling in the economic relationship as
the public boycotts Japanese goods and Japan refuses
further cooperation; an inability by the government to
craft the policy toward Japan that they want and the
public will support, limiting the Party’s legitimacy
and power; and a possibility for Chinese civil unrest.
All of these scenarios jeopardize China’s continued
stability, development, and economic growth during
their window of strategic opportunity. At the risk of
exaggerating, this is the ultimate threat to China.
The threat to China is manifested in several ways.
First, the threats of economic cooling and diminishing
Party power are made possible by “old thinking”
about Japan. This is the same paradigm the Chinese
have hewed to since signing the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship with Japan in 1978. Old thinking also limits
the Party’s ability to craft a new policy toward Japan
that is more conducive to furthering economic ties.
Second, excessive nationalism and the news media that
inflame such nationalism make possible the potential
loss of Party control over policy and civil unrest.
There also is a traditional military threat from Japan’s
increasing military capabilities and expenditures. In
addition to Japan’s growing nationalism and political
conservatism, the influential elite are concerned
about Japan’s increasing offensive capabilities and
motivations. The U.S. factor plays into this traditional
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threat, further complicating Sino-Japanese relations
and the issue of Taiwan. Meanwhile, issues of
legitimate dispute regarding the ownership of territory
and potential resources in the East China Sea—issues
that provide the greatest likelihood for military
engagement—are not as threatening in the eyes of the
influential elite as the threats to economic stability or
Party control. The Chinese believe international law is
on their side. Discussion of this issue, as well as that of
the traditional military threat Japan poses, will follow
an examination of the threat China poses to itself over
Japan.
The History of Sino-Japanese Relations:
It’s Hardly History.
Before examining this internally generated threat,
it is important to underscore just how emotional and
nonobjective the feelings are that Chinese harbor
toward Japan. To most Chinese, the 20th-century
atrocities suffered at the hands of the Japanese may
as well have occurred last year. A public opinion poll,
conducted by China Daily, a Japanese think tank, and
Peking University, from May to August 2005, found
that the first thing coming to Chinese minds when
asked about Japan is the 1937 Nanjing Massacre.131
(The second thing is electric appliances.) There is a
strong resentment toward the Japanese and a belief that
they have not sufficiently atoned for their sins against
China (or Korea) during their campaigns of expansion,
occupation, and plunder that began in the late 1800s
and continued until the end of World War II. The
rape, murder, theft, and arson suffered by countless
thousands of Chinese civilians in Nanjing came to
symbolize Japanese aggression and ruthlessness
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toward the Chinese. Thus, anything that reminds the
Chinese of this history is akin to pouring salt on an
open wound. Repeated Japanese presidential visits
to the Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted World War
II war criminals are enshrined (along with millions
of other war dead), are a reminder not only of the
past atrocities committed, but affirm the perception
that the Japanese are not sufficiently sorry for them.
Further, this lack of penitence serves to fuel Chinese
fears that the Japanese will commit the same mistakes
again as they allow rising nationalism and militarism
to seep back into their “fundamentally ruthless” and
“bloodthirsty” strategic culture.132
This fixation on history has prevented Sino-Japanese
relations from maturing beyond the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship agreed to in 1978. The squabbles—over
shrine visits, history textbooks, territory in the East
China Sea, the extent to which Japan can and should
expand its military capabilities—are the same issues
they were disputing 20 years ago. While the economies
of the two have increasingly grown interdependent, the
attitudes and people-to-people affinity for one another
have not kept pace. As most Chinese influential elite
characterize this dichotomy, their relationship is one of
“economic warmth” and “political coldness.”
Because of the perception by the Chinese that the
Japanese have wronged them so severely in the past
and then failed to acknowledge that fact and apologize
sufficiently, there is an overriding belief that the
responsibility for the troubled relationship rests solely
with the Japanese. (It is worth noting, however, that
much of the reason for the ongoing hatred is a result of
China’s “patriotic education.”) As Deng Xiaoping said
to Japanese cabinet officials in 1987, “Frankly speaking,
the responsibility was never China’s. Not one of the
past and present troubles was caused by China.”133
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This attitude permeates scholarly and news media
publications as well as public opinion to this day.
Such an attitude—that it is all Japan’s fault—is
combined with a longtime perception of inequality.
Through China’s lens of comparative power, there
has always been a superior/inferior dynamic between
China and Japan such that the countries have never
perceived themselves as equals. Japan once revered
China for its sophisticated culture and attempted
to emulate its neighbor. China perceived itself as a
bigger, stronger, more advanced country—until they
were defeated soundly by the Japanese in the SinoJapanese War of 1894-95. Despite China’s larger and
better equipped forces, the army and navy were routed
by a more mobile and better trained Japanese force.134
China thus looked to its conqueror as an example of
the economic and political modernizations it needed to
make.
But beyond the early years of the 1900s, the
20th century continued to be full of conflict and
confrontation. The Chinese were often the losers,
as Japan (following the lead of the other imperialist
nations—Russia, France, Britain, and the United States)
invaded, plundered, and “carved up” China. But in
1945, Japan finally experienced defeat (although not at
the hands of the Chinese in Japan’s eyes). Japan then
allied with U.S. forces who fought Chinese “volunteers”
in the Korean War. It was not until the 1970s that the
two countries would try to get beyond this win-or-lose
cycle and explore a more cooperative approach. They
still were not equals, however, because Japan’s rapid
modernization and economic growth ranked them
second only to the United States in China’s calculus of
comprehensive national power.
But today, for the first time in their tumultuous
history, China’s economic might is rivaling Japan’s,
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while Japan is striving for political and military power
commensurate with its economic power. The two
countries are more equal than they have ever been. It is
an awkward, emotional, and distrustful relationship.
The possibility of having to approach each other as
peer-to-peer instead of student-to-teacher or victorto-vanquished makes the relationship all the more
complicated. China thus forms its perceptions of
the Japanese threat from the vantage of unresolved
historical animosity and a strategic balance that is
equalizing steadily.
The Threat of Old Thinking.
In 2003, a rare debate erupted in China about national policy toward Japan. It began with a series of
articles that were more provocative than usual. These
articles were likely prompted, or at the very least
approved, by the new administration of Hu Jintao, who
seemed inclined to take a softer line toward Japan than
his predecessor. The “new thinking” on Japan suggested
getting past history, taking some responsibility for
improving the relationship, and accepting Japan as a
“normal” country (meaning one that has political and
military power comparable to its economic power).
This new thinking was met with harsh resistance and a
series of unfortunate events made the implementation
of this new thinking very difficult.
No member of the Chinese influential elite has
written of any sort of threat posed by “old thinking”
per se. Chinese writers do not admit that the “new
thinking” was prompted by China’s leadership itself,
or that they agreed with it (although sources in the
Japanese press, as well as members of the influential
elite interviewed in Shanghai, did aver that the Chinese
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leadership was responsible for it).135 But by exploring
the “new thinking” debate, the events that transpired
after the new thinking was proposed, and the resulting
Japan policy that was announced, we can gain a clearer
view of how old thinking constitutes a threat.
In December 2002, just weeks after President Hu
Jintao assumed power, Ma Licheng of Renmin Ribao’s
(People’s Daily) Commentary Department published an
article in Zhanyue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management)
entitled “New Thoughts for China-Japan Relations—
Worrisome Problems Among Chinese and Japanese
People.” It was an unusual article in that it was a
personal account of his travels in Japan. His message
also was atypical, both in its candor and the not-toosubtle blame it placed on the Chinese for the problems
in the relationship. Ma wanted to give his audience an
accurate portrayal of Japan, going so far as to claim: “To
be honest, Japan is the pride of Asia.”136 He countered
the “irresponsible sensationalism” that led the Chinese
to believe that Japan is collapsing economically,
refuted hyped military capabilities and intentions,
and dismissed the perception of a rising Japanese
militarism. Taking an honest look at his own country,
he then noted “huge, thorny problems at home” such
as corruption, income disparities, and a deteriorating
environment. He scolded his fellow countrymen for
confusing patriotism with ignorance and allowing
nationalism to seep into foreign relations: “While
we need to boost people’s morale by publicizing the
successes we have achieved in reforms and opening
up, overdoing it is a sickness. . . .’’137 Ma concluded as
follows:
We must look forward. Building an efficient economic
and market system is the new arena for wrestling. China
and Japan are the pivots of Asia, and the two peoples
should reflect on their nationalistic feelings, overcome
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their narrow-mindedness, and move ahead toward
integration, expediting the formation of the ChinaASEAN free trade zone, and concluding the ChinaJapan-South Korea free trade agreement. These are our
responsibilities, the Asian people’s aspirations, and the
trend of development.138

The reaction to Ma’s article was, in his words,
“unbelievable.”139 The Chinese online community
launched fierce attacks against him on the internet. He
received “piles of letters, faxed messages, and emails”
filled with “sharp-tongued threats like ‘I will kill you’
and ‘I’ll dig up your ancestors’ grave.’”140
Despite the angry public response to Ma’s
argument, a series of scholars followed him into the
debate. Shi Yinhong, a professor at Chinese People’s
University, published an article in March 2003 in the
same journal. Entitled “Sino-Japanese Rapprochement
and ‘Diplomatic Revolution,’” Shi also argued that
the Chinese should recognize their contribution to
the beleaguered and worsening state of relations,
putting forward rather dramatic proposals for Chinese
actions that could lead to a diplomatic revolution
and rapprochement. He proposed that (1) China take
historical problems off the diplomatic agenda and
quiet the corresponding propaganda; (2) strive for a big
increase in Japanese imports and investment in China,
perhaps to the detriment of U.S. and European trade
and investment (and, along with this, show gratitude
for the economic aid Japan already has provided); (3)
be “inwardly vigilant” and outwardly magnanimous
about Japan’s military modernization; (4) welcome
Japan as a great power; and (5) actively support Japan’s
UN Security Council membership application.141
Shi admitted that he made these proposals not as
a Japan-watcher and not for the sake of good relations
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in and of themselves. Instead, he saw it as a strategy
that would allow China to focus on those policies that
require greater attention: the situation with Taiwan and
relations with the United States. As he told a Japanese
journalist, “China is in a hostile relationship with the
United States and Taiwan, and [relations with] India
also hold the possibility of being hostile, so they don’t
have the ability to be hostile with Japan.”142
Throughout the summer of 2003, other members of
the influential elite entered the fray to debate how far
China should go to improve Sino-Japanese relations.143
However, the relationship continued to deteriorate.
In 2005, coined the “year of many matters” in SinoJapanese relations, Japan named China as a threat in its
National Defense Program Guidelines for the first time.144
Japan announced that it would stop extending new
loans to China in 2008, ending 25 years of economic
assistance.145 Military activity, economic plans, and oil
and gas exploration continued in the East China Sea,
and no agreements were reached. The Japanese (again)
approved history textbooks lacking sufficient accuracy
regarding their role in World War II, according to
the Chinese. Anti-Japan riots occurred across China,
protesting a lost soccer game and Japan’s bid for a seat
on the UN Security Council. An incident involving leftover chemical weapons occurred (again) and Japanese
President Koizumi (again) visited the Yasukuni Shrine,
prompting sharp recriminations from China and a
cancellation of bilateral talks (again).
While none of these events were new in themselves—this could just as likely have been 1985, with
textbook disputes, shrine visits, boundary-testing in the
East China Sea, and failed attempts at diplomacy—the
frequency and intensity of these incidents in 2005 was
noteworthy. The Chinese public’s opinion about them,
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the news media’s selective coverage of the events, and
the government’s effort to control both public opinion
and the news media demonstrate just how threatening
old thinking is to the Communist Party.
Public Opinion and the News Media:
Threat of “Excessive Nationalism.”146
According to a poll conducted by China Daily’s
weekly youth newspaper, 80 percent of young people
have never met anyone from Japan, and more than
60 percent said they formed their opinions about
Japan through the press, TV, and the internet. It is
understandable, then, why more than half of the
respondents said they hated or disliked that country. 147
The news media’s influence on public opinion may also
be a reason why 90 percent of the Chinese blame Japan
for their strained relationship in another poll,148 why 64
percent said they disliked Japan in yet another poll, and
why nearly the same percentage did not know about
Japan’s development assistance to China totaling 3.3
trillion yen.149 Even when polled on specific issues the
news media covers closely, the results were similarly
striking. For instance, Xinhua, the PRC’s official news
agency, reported that 96 percent of those surveyed felt
that the new Japanese history textbook “severely hurt
the Chinese people’s feelings.”150 Likewise, a similarly
overwhelming majority, 91 percent, were opposed to
Koizumi’s shrine visits, according to a poll conducted
jointly by a Japanese and South Korean newspaper and
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.151
The bias in Chinese reporting goes beyond editorial
decisions. The headlines alone demonstrate the blame
accorded to Japan. In announcing the release of Japan’s
Defense White Paper, Xinhua used the headline,
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“Japan’s Official Paper Groundless in Exaggerating
‘China Threat,’”152 and Ta Kung Pao’s shouted “Japan’s
Defense White Paper Will Further Worsen Sino-Japanese Relations.”153 While these articles are just reporting
the news, the editorial headlines are even more slanted. After President Koizumi’s fourth Yasukuni shrine
visit in October 2005, Xinhua published a commentary
titled “Koizumi Cannot Escape Historical Guilt,” while
Renmin Ribao’s commentary was titled “Challenge to
Human Conscience and International Justice.”154
The internet is an even more outspoken source of
Japanese criticism in China. A very vocal population
of Chinese bloggers has devoted itself to spreading
an anti-Japanese message. In 2003, seven websites
launched a campaign to collect one million signatures (a goal reached in short order) expressing dissatisfaction with a Japanese response regarding the disposition of residual chemical weapons. An online petition
launched in March 2005 on Sina.com opposing Japan’s
bid for a Security Council seat collected more than
four million signatures in under a week.155 There also
is a more malign online community of Chinese hackers
that prides itself on its violation and defacement of
Japanese government and business websites, usually
in retaliation for events such as shrine visits or East
China Sea disputes.156
Both the Japanese and Chinese governments
recognize that these strong and negative opinions,
largely informed and inflamed by the news media,
seriously impede mutual efforts to improve relations.
This recognition was the reason behind the recent
inauguration of an annual Beijing-Tokyo Forum on
Japan-China relations that is scheduled to continue for
10 years. At the first meeting of this forum in August
2005, the editor-in-chief of the China Daily admitted

68

that, given the public’s dependence on the news media
for their opinions, news media organizations could
and should do more to promote good relations.157
The Asian Cup Soccer Games which China hosted
in 2004 put on public display several themes related
to this discussion. Some Chinese soccer fans engaged
in unsportsmanlike conduct at the outset of the
tournament, booing and jeering the Japanese team
during their national anthem.158 But such behavior had
been anticipated by the Chinese government, which
attempted to preempt it through a large-scale publicity
campaign in which it urged fans to have confidence in
the Chinese government, view the match in a “civilized
manner,” and leave politics out of it.159 Despite the
government’s efforts, however, after Japan defeated
China in the finals, a demonstration erupted, and a car
carrying Japanese diplomats was overturned.
While the Japanese press covered these events,
including pictures and editorials, in all major news
outlets, the Chinese public was privy to little or no
reporting on the incident. Telephone interviews
conducted by a Japanese newspaper found that most
Chinese remained unaware of the uproar.160 China’s
Foreign Ministry spokesman only had this to say
in response to a question about the attack on the
Japanese envoy: “It is obvious to all that China made
enormous efforts to ensure that the Asian Cup soccer
tournament would be held smoothly and successfully.
We did not like to witness some individuals’ extreme
behavior.”161 This remark was reported without further
explanation.
The most significant and yet underreported events
were the large anti-Japanese demonstrations that
spread throughout several major cities in April 2005,
about a year later. They were not covered because the
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Central Government prohibited it, due to the threat
to stability and the economy that the protests posed.
Earlier, in late March, online activists had launched
a signature drive opposing Japan’s bid for a seat on
the UN Security Council. The news media fueled the
flames by publishing reports on the success of this
drive, as well as commentaries questioning Japan’s
qualifications for UN Security Council membership.162
The well-respected Hong Kong newspaper, Ming Pao,
reported on April 5 that a spate of spontaneous antiJapanese activities occurred in a number of cities,
prompting the Central Government to ask Party and
local officials to “properly guide the patriotic fervor of
the masses.” Unnamed sources admitted that Beijing
authorities were “deeply concerned and nervous”
about the heightened anti-Japanese sentiment and
were worried that the public “might spin out of
control and give rise to other social problems.” Ming
Pao also reported that the news media received notice
from the Central Propaganda Department to tone
down reporting on the signature drives and to halt all
reporting on other protest activities, specifically their
threat to boycott Japanese goods.163
Despite the government’s efforts to temper unrest,
a 20,000-person demonstration organized over the
internet erupted in Tiananmen Square on April 9. This
was the biggest protest in China since the infamous
student demonstration at the same location in 1989. The
following day, a similar number of people participated
in protests in Guangzhou and Shenzen. In accordance
with the government’s order, none of the mainland
newspapers, television stations, or news websites
covered these events.
These protests were mentioned regularly in the
weeks following, however, serving as the backdrop
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and reason for a full-fledged propaganda campaign.
As reported in Xinhua on April 19: “In order to help
the cadres and masses to get to know the international
situation and the history and current state of SinoJapanese relations and China’s policy toward Japan,
and correctly understand and support the central
authorities’ decisionmaking and arrangements,” 3,500
party, government, and army officials were called to a
meeting held by the Central Propaganda Department.
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing addressed the crowd,
cajoling it as follows:
China is now in an important period of comprehensively
building a well-off society and we must fully understand
the importance of properly handling Sino-Japanese
relations from the overall and strategic plane. We must
believe that the party and government are completely
capable of proceeding from the nation’s fundamental
interests in properly handling the various problems
we face in relations with Japan. We must correctly
understand the situation in the world today, get an
accurate grasp of our basic national condition, resolutely
implement the central authorities’ series of important
decisions and arrangements, consciously preserve the
political situation of stability and unity, strengthen our
concept of the legal system, and express our feelings in
calm, rational, legal, and orderly fashion; we should not
take part in processions and other activities that have not
been approved, and do nothing to affect social stability.
We must cherish and make good use of the period of rare
historic opportunity, climb high and see far while also
keeping our feet firmly on the ground, convert patriotic
fervor into practical action in doing a good job at our
work posts and in assiduous study, and contribute our
effort to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.164

“Explanation and publicity teams” organized by the
Propaganda Department then were sent to universities
in Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou where protests
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had occurred to provide the same educational lecture
to students there. Concurrently, the Ministry of Public
Security reminded citizens of the laws regarding
demonstrations, the need for permission from public
security departments, and the illegality of organizing
such events over the internet or cell phones without
prior approval.
A number of press commentaries and editorials
echoed the message put forth by Li: stability is of
utmost importance to a harmonious society and “cool
judgment” and rationality are needed when expressing
“righteous anger.”165 Boycotting Japanese products
was discouraged frequently, reminding Chinese that
such an act would “run counter to the masses’ good
aspirations” and seriously hurt their own economy and
their goal of peaceful development during this time of
strategic opportunity. 166
This all-out offensive to quell anti-Japanese sentiment and the instability that “excessive nationalism”
provoked, demonstrated the threat perceived by the
Central Government.167 As new thinker Shi Yinhong
admitted in an interview with a Hong Kong journalist
on the second day of protests, the Central Government
would not allow such protests to go on for too long:
“Some government officials may think this can be used
as leverage against Japan but at the same time, it can
restrict the government.”168 It is such restriction that
the government fears.
China’s Japan Policy: “New Thinking” Tempered
by Public Opinion.
In the same month that the widespread antiJapanese protests occurred—April 2005—as SinoJapanese relations spiraled downward, worsened by
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the news media’s strong anti-Japanese slant and the
public’s vehemence, Beijing announced its first official
policy toward Japan. Hu Jintao outlined his five-point
proposal to develop and strengthen Sino-Japanese
relations in a press conference following a meeting
with President Koizumi in Indonesia. His five points
were (1) strictly adhere to the three standing political
documents (the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, Treaty
of Peace and Friendship, and Joint Declaration), (2)
“persist in making history the mirror and looking
forward to the future,” (3) correctly handle the Taiwan
issue, (4) properly handle differences between China
and Japan by continuing dialogue and negotiations on
an equal footing, and (5) further expand exchange and
cooperation.169
The influences of both new thinking and public
opinion are evident in these five points. History was
not disregarded, despite the new thinkers’ suggestion
to do so. But it does temper the issue of history by
using it to look forward to the future—a message
likely directed at the Chinese public more than Japan.
The five points also reflect the widely held assumption
that the burden was on Japan to make amends—the
only party with the potential to incorrectly handle the
Taiwan issue. This nod also was a blow to the new
thinking that suggested China should start taking
greater responsibility for the relationship’s woes. But
the emphasis on dialogue and cooperation did require
that China act to advance the relationship as well. And
dialogue and cooperation were certainly not the will
of the people who were demonstrating even as this
policy was pronounced. Points 4 and 5 demonstrate
that the Central Government agreed with what all of
the influential elite had concluded during their debate
over China’s Japan policy: worsening Sino-Japanese
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relations would impact their economy negatively and
impede China’s economic transition and social reforms
during its time of strategic opportunity. The policy was
a reflection of new thinking, public opinion, Central
Party objectives, and the complexity of the bilateral
relationship. It was Beijing’s attempt to diffuse the
threat to its economy, to social stability, and to security
posed not by Japan so much as by its own public and
news media and their attachment to stagnant old
thinking.
It is interesting to note that just two days prior to
the new policy pronouncement, the most outspoken
new thinker, Shi Yinhong, published an article entitled
“The Immediate and Remote Causes of Deterioration
in Sino-Japanese Relations.” In it, he justified his own—
and, in turn, the government’s—movement away
from “new thinking” toward a more hardline policy.
The shift, he argued, came from the public’s position,
(informed by extensive news media coverage of Japan)
which has “the right to shape” China’s policy:
Beginning roughly from the end of 2002 till recently,
Chinese leaders headed by Hu Jintao, out of good will and
consideration for the overall situation, took the initiative
on several occasions to make gestures to Japan to ease
tension and improve relations. However, the Japanese
Government not only on the whole failed to counter with
substantive (or even posturing) active responses, but
also repeatedly adopted unilateral actions on disputed
issues and even unprecedentedly butted against
China’s bottom line toward Japan over the particularly
sensitive Taiwan issue, coupling it with the prime
minister’s repeatedly paying homage to the Yasukuni
Shrine. Consequently, the Chinese Government’s deep
indignation and switch to an unprecedentedly hardline
policy are understandable. In recent months, the Chinese
news media have given frequent, concentrated, and prominent
coverage to negative reports and commentaries on Japan and
its conduct toward China. In this way, “the right to shape”
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China’s position toward Japan has partly been shifted to the
people, which objectively contributed to the anti-Japan
marches in many Chinese cities.170 (italics added)

Professor Shi, who had launched the debate about
China’s relationship with Japan, introduced innovative
“new thinking,” and actively promoted rapprochement
just 3 years earlier, returned to old thinking. He did
so due to a series of unfortunate events that impeded
the possibility for warmer relations and because of
the vocal and even vehement opinions of the news
media and the public. His outlook, once optimistic,
turned gloomy: “The increasing deterioration in SinoJapanese relations, if unchecked, definitely will put the
two countries’ respective fundamental interests at risk
and endanger stability and security in East Asia.”171
The Traditional Military Threat.
While the threat ignited by anti-Japanese sentiment
is significant, the threat posed by Japan’s growing
military capability and seeming willingness to use it
should not be overlooked. In the words of Li Xiushi of
the School of World Economy and Politics at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences: “Japan’s military
strategy and the U.S.-Japan alliance are currently
forming a new challenge and strategic threat to
China.”172 These two factors—Japan’s changing military
strategy and its alliance with the United States—often
are seen as intertwined. One Chinese journalist noted
that the Japanese military has become the combat
force with the greatest degree of modernization in
Asia, the development of which is “inseparably linked
with its ample financial resources and ambitions, and
it also is inseparable from the international support
and encouragement from the United States.”173 As
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Professor Wu Xinbo put it, from a Chinese perspective,
the “silver lining” in the U.S.-Japan alliance has come
to an end. In the past, the United States constrained
Japan’s rearmament; now, it is driving it.174 Li Xiushi
tracked the “continual upgrades” to the U.S.-Japan
alliance and how Japan’s military strategy and
buildup progressively have become more evident.175
Li argued that the alliance shifted from suppressing
internal disorder in Japan in the 1950s to targeting
the Soviet Union in the 1980s to controlling the AsiaPacific region in the 1990s, when the treaty expanded
to include joint action and involvement in Japan’s
periphery.176 Further, Japan was no longer subordinate
to the United States as they became equal partners in
securing the Asia Pacific region. According to Michael
Pillsbury, who had surveyed China’s influential elite
in the 1990s, there was at that time a consensus that
the U.S.-Japan alliance was weakening as Japan’s
economic and technological gains were encroaching
on and surpassing those of the United States.177 This
argument has disappeared from more recent writings,
however, as the alliance strengthened in the wake of
9/11. After 9/11, Li contends that the two countries’
integration of their military strategies expanded from
“controlling the periphery” to a “comprehensive
outward attack mode.”178 The consensus today among
China’s influential elite is that Japan has moved beyond
voicing support for the United States and is becoming
more actively involved in lending support to U.S.
policy, especially in containing China:
Figuratively speaking, Japan was the “concubine”
in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the past. As such, it was
basically at the beck and call of the United States and
was totally dependent on the United States in security
and defense matters. Today, its role has gradually been
elevated to one of “lover” and its military independence
76

and flexibility has been greatly strengthened. While
shouldering more self-defense responsibilities, it also is
enjoying substantially greater military freedom. As their
military “integration” further deepens, Japanese and
U.S. troops have virtually become two designations of a
single armed service in Japan.179

The reason for this strained view is a series of
changes in Japan’s defense policies, all of which are
seen as influenced by and serving the United States,
and the expansion of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Japan’s
Law on Special Antiterrorism Measures, involvement
in the Proliferation Security Initiative, deployment to
Iraq, and efforts to amend its constitution in favor of
greater operational latitude by its military forces, all
exemplify Japan’s growing willingness and capability
to project military power beyond its borders and to
move beyond its strictly defensive posture. Further,
Japan has involved itself in China and Taiwan affairs.
Japan’s 2005 Defense White Paper publicly questioned
China’s military modernization and indicated that
Japan would pay close attention to China’s navy. And
in the latest U.S.-Japan Security Statement, security
in the Taiwan Strait is mentioned for the first time
as a “common strategic objective.” The troubling
development of China’s military power also is noted
as a shared concern. The inclusion of Taiwan is the
most disturbing aspect of the expanded U.S.-Japan
alliance from the perspective of China, which already
is concerned about U.S. intervention in this “internal”
issue. Shi Yinhong, whose opinion toward Japan may
have shifted most on this issue, termed the development
“abominable,” as Taiwan is far outside the bilateral
affairs of Japan and the United States.180
In addition to Japan’s more active, unrestricted
military posture, China also sees Japan with resources,
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a defense budget, and technological sophistication
that surpass its own. One of China’s indicators in
calculating a country’s comprehensive national power
is “resources for national power,” which is determined
by quantifying a country’s science and technology,
human capital, and capital resources. Japan is ranked
second in this category, behind the United States.181
Japan’s defense budget is 1.62 times the amount
of China’s, according to China’s Foreign Ministry
spokesman, even though Japan’s forces protect a land
area and population only 4 and 10 percent the size
of China’s, respectively.182 This defense budget has
allowed Japan to procure Aegis missile destroyers and
collaborate with the United States in missile defense.
An article in Liaowang noted that Japan,
under the name of “Self Defense Forces,” built land,
sea, and air forces whose armaments have become more
and more sophisticated, and Japan’s military spending
is second in the world. Japan has advanced rocket
technology. Its H-2, M-5 satellites, and N-series rockets
could be quickly converted into long-range missiles or
cruise missiles. If Japan’s M-5 rockets are turned into
missiles, they can easily outperform the MX missiles of
the United States, and they could reach the U.S. mainland,
with a range between 12,000 and 16,000 km. Japan admits
that it has the capability to develop nuclear weapons
and that nuclear weapons can be produced in 7 days.
In addition, the nuclear materials that Japan possesses
are enough to produce 7,000 nuclear warheads. If these
nuclear warheads are attached to missiles, they become
nuclear weapons. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger pointed out long ago that “it will come as no
surprise if Japan goes nuclear someday.”183

This quotation demonstrates that beyond the
conventional military threat posed by Japan, the
possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament also is a
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serious concern to China’s influential elite. In 2002,
a Japanese Cabinet Secretary commented on the
possibility of revising the three non-nuclear principles
and the Peace Constitution so that Japan could pursue
nuclear weapons. This prompted several Chinese
journal articles about the Japanese capability to
develop nuclear weapons rapidly. As Yang Yunzhong
observed, Japan “possesses all conditions to develop
nuclear weapons”—a capable cadre of scientists,
plutonium for thousands of warheads, a powerful and
sophisticated nuclear energy capacity, and a long-range
delivery capability.184 Yang further argued that the
probability that Japan would pursue nuclear weapons
was growing as efforts to amend its Constitution would
remove legal obstacles, while Japanese public opinion
was shifting toward tacit consent or even support for
nuclear armament.
The only other barrier, American opposition, also
was being removed as the Nuclear Posture Review
“unequivocally points out that the United States will
increase its nuclear military presence in the East Asia
region.” This changing American nuclear military
strategy would serve to “loosen the United States
nuclear shackles on Japan [that have existed] for half
a century.”185 A front page Renmin Wang article in 2004
also concluded that Japan was “standing on the nuclear
threshold.”186 Beyond the raw materials, Japan’s
technology, especially relating to the development of
nuclear energy, is “world class.” Its reactor capacity
ranks third in the world, and it is leading the world
in breeder reactor technology. The authors also noted
that Japan possesses computer technology to simulate
nuclear testing, eliminating the need to detonate a
weapon.
The nuclear threat is not mentioned regularly along
with the usual litany of concerns about Japan (rising
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nationalism, failure to learn the lessons of history,
repeated shrine visits), but the Chinese influential elite
nonetheless recognize that the potential for a nucleararmed Japan is a threat. Beyond the threat of a nucleararmed Japan to national security, it also is considered a
proliferation threat, making way for a possible nuclear
domino effect in East Asia, with South Korea and
Taiwan following suit.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Japan’s military
advancements, policy changes, and transformation to
a “normal” country concern China for exactly the same
reasons that China’s military buildup is troubling to
the United States. As a research fellow at the China
Institute of International Studies (CIIS) lamented,
the magnitude and nature of the changes in Japan’s
security policies and the level and degree of its military
buildup will have a major impact on the regional
security situation, and it is impossible for the countries
in the region not to have doubts about where Japan’s
security policies are headed, while changes in political
perceptions and the rise of nationalist feelings at home
in Japan have exacerbated these concerns.187

The rapid transformation, changing regional power
balance, and ambiguity of intentions all provide reason
for concern by the Chinese; interestingly, they are the
same concerns most often voiced by other countries
with respect to China itself.
Japan’s ambiguous intentions as perceived by
China come from the rising conservative political
faction in Japan. Combined with the military threat, a
threat from political “neocons” emanates from Japan
just as it does from the United States. Former President
Koizumi’s stubborn insistence on visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine (despite the controversy it ignited in his own
public and the fury it prompted in his neighbors)
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effectively ground diplomatic exchanges to a halt until
Shinzo Abe took office in 2006. Legislative efforts by
Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party have resulted in
21 major pieces of security-related legislation since
1992—nine in 2004 alone—legitimizing and legalizing
the deployment of military forces abroad.188 The party’s
efforts to revise Article 9 of the Peace Constitution is
seen by China’s influential elite as the last remaining
obstacle to all-out, unrestrained Japanese military
mobilization. This nationalist, conservative political
force in Japan—characterized by an unwillingness to
admit the wrongdoings of the past or learn from them,
while aggressively reconstituting its military force—is
the threat most felt by the influential elite.
The Real—But Not Perceived—
Threat in the East China Sea.
A threat not so frequently lamented is that of
conflict over disputed territory in the East China
Sea. Interviews with members of the influential elite
in Shanghai demonstrated a certain confidence in
China’s ability to prevent military confrontation with
Japan because they had been successful in deterring
and preventing such an incident to date. Another
reason this may not get too much attention may be the
uneven news media coverage of events in this region.
While Japanese actions perceived as hurtful and
threatening receive abundant news media attention,
Chinese actions that may be equally threatening to the
Japanese do not. For instance, the intrusion of China’s
nuclear-powered submarine into Japanese waters near
the Diaoyu Islands in late 2004 was not covered by the
Chinese press.189 An independent Hong Kong paper,
along with the Japanese press, reported that the Chinese
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expressed regret to the Japanese Foreign Minister and
blamed the incident on a technical error; there was no
such admission in the mainland press.190 Chinese naval
activity continued, however, with Japan’s Maritime
Self-Defense Forces reporting in July 2005 that 12
People’s Republic of China (PRC) naval incursions into
Japanese territory occurred since the beginning of the
year. Chinese reconnaissance planes also repeatedly
intruded into Japanese territory in the East China
Sea. A Japanese television program reported that
Japan’s Self-Defense Forces scrambled their fighters to
intercept Chinese aircraft 30 times between April and
September 2005, double the number of such incidents
in all of 2004.191 The only mention of this in the Chinese
news media: the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman
was quoted in the English version of Xinhua as saying
that all Chinese activities in the East China Sea were in
accordance with international law and conventions.192
While sensitive events often go unreported in
mainland news media at the time of their occurrence,
they are sometimes referenced in articles later, as if they
are common knowledge. For example, nearly a year
after the Chinese submarine was spotted in Japanese
waters, a Chinese journalist made reference to the “socalled submarine invasion” as one of the events that
President Koizumi had used to justify his hardline
stance against China. Referring to it in this way, the
journalist not only made the event seem like it was
something everyone knew about, he also downplayed
its significance.193
In contrast to the dearth of coverage on China’s
activities in the East China Sea, Japan’s activities in the
area receive plenty of attention. For example, the July
2005 decision to let a Japanese petroleum company
explore parts of the area prompted two harsh editorials
in the China Daily. Both editorials took very hard lines,
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blaming Japan for the dispute while maintaining
that China wanted to resolve the issues through
consultation: “If a confrontation were to result, the
blame would sit firmly with Japan.”194
The frequency of military activity in this region
should prompt concern on both sides about the real
possibility of a misunderstanding or escalation leading
to military engagement. And the issues—of who owns
what, where the territorial lines are drawn, what can or
cannot be claimed as territory—are very complicated.
The fact that precious natural resources are (or at least
are perceived to be) in dispute makes the stakes even
higher. Yet China’s influential elite do not convey
significant concern over this possibility. Newspaper
commentaries warn that the Chinese may be forced
to act—but they do not fret over the consequences of
conflict. Tian Zhongqing, director of the Asia-Pacific
Office at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies,
is one of the few scholars who worry that actions
resulting from Japan’s authorization for drilling may
“sow the seed of real conflict between the two countries
[and that] the possibility of an armed conflict cannot be
ruled out.”195
But Major General Yao Youzhi, head of Strategic
Research at China’s Academy of Military Sciences,
said that Japan’s authorization for drilling would not
escalate to a military conflict. He takes a hard line on
the issue but denies that military conflict will ensue—
in the short term: “As long as the East China Sea issue
is concerned, we will by no means tolerate Japan’s
behavior, neither will we give way to Japan’s behavior.
China will deal with the issue from the height of peace
in East Asia and world peace, and will not bring the
contradiction up to the level of military conflict in the
short term.”196 This viewpoint overlooks the possibility
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of Japan taking military action in response to Chinese
actions in the disputed region. It also does not rule
out military engagement in the long term. The real
dispute over territory and resources in the East China
Sea provides a venue for all of the other unresolved
problems and emotion that taints the Sino-Japanese
relationship to come into play. It is a threat that the
Chinese and Japanese (and the rest of the region, along
with the United States) should be concerned about—
more so than they currently are—and should work
aggressively to avert.
Conclusion: An Unresolved Past
and Uncertain Future.
According to Jin Linbo, an expert with the China
Research Institute, the ever-growing anti-Japanese
sentiment in the Chinese public is putting serious
pressure on the central authorities’ foreign policy.
Jin notes that “the ‘new thought’ on relations with
Japan advocated by Shi Yinhong and other scholars
enabled Chinese diplomats to achieve consensus
among themselves on many issues.” 197 However, Jin is
careful to make a distinction between such diplomatic
consensus and a very different consensus among the
Chinese public. China’s new Japan policy attempted
to bridge this divide between the influential elite, who
all agree that better Sino-Japanese relations are needed
if economic “warmth” is to continue, and the public,
which harbors historical resentment inconsistent with
today’s economic realities.
Despite the Chinese government’s efforts to
strengthen the relationship (in order to ensure
continued economic development) and its efforts
to quell anti-Japanese sentiment (in order to ensure
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stability), neither is guaranteed. The threat to China’s
development, stability, and security posed by the Japan
issue (if not Japan itself) is very real. Chinese policies
for countering these threats are the same as the policies
to counter the threat of American containment: increase
mutual trust and maintain economic interdependence.
Hu Jintao’s declared Japan policy was an effort to do
just that. (A deterrent military capability also is part of
this strategy, but it seems there is very little in China’s
military strategy directly aimed at Japan. It is likely
that the thinking is that if they can build capability to
deter the United States, they can deal with Japan.) But
it is hard to accomplish these goals of increased trust
and economic cooperation with an unresolved history
of animosity and an uncertain future of mutually
mounting military capabilities and nationalism.
The threat from Japan is thus more of a traditional
one than the threat posed by the United States. The
likelihood that Japan and China could engage in
military confrontation is considerable, given their
mutual mistrust, proximity, and legitimate territorial
disputes. Mutual military presences in the East China
Sea and inadequate attention given to the possibility
of conflict make it an all-too-likely venue for a military
incident. Inadequate lines of communication and crisis
management mechanisms make escalation a further
concern. Public opinion and domestic politics in both
countries also increase the possibility for military
engagement and escalation.
But, interestingly, the threat Japan poses to China’s
economy and stability is more troubling to China’s
influential elite. If China’s leadership is unable to
temper or contain the public’s anti-Japanese sentiment,
Japanese investment could decrease significantly.
Further, anti-Japanese protests and boycotts could
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spiral out of control and ultimately target the Chinese
government, especially if it is perceived as sympathetic
to Japan due to new thinking and a softening policy
position. Finally, there is a threat to the viability of
the Party if it is unable to implement its Japan policy
or persuade the public that the Party is acting in the
nation’s interest. China’s territorial integrity, continued
social and economic development, and a favored place
in a peaceful international environment are all seen as
endangered by Japan.
III. THE THREAT FROM INDIA
The year 2006 was the “Year of China-India Friendship.” 198 The Chinese influential elite marked the
occasion by reflecting positively on the history of the
bilateral relationship and emphasizing the similarities
of the two countries. Chinese and Indian leaders
made regular exchanges and frequent declarations of
the “good neighborliness, friendship, and mutually
beneficial cooperation in which they are engaged.”199
But the history of the relationship is hardly so friendly,
and the issues that historically prompted mutual suspicion remain unresolved. Further, competition for
resources, market share, and international influence
is intensifying between the two rising countries. The
reason for the recent emphasis on cooperation is
straightforward: If China and India do not cooperate,
they compete. And competition makes China’s preferred
“win-win” situation untenable. As Xinhua declared
after an Asian Conference in April 2006, “China, India
Achieve Win-Win Through Co-op.”200 One of the
conference’s meetings even featured a session titled
“India and China—Strength in Partnership.”201
Beyond competition, there are other reasons China
considers India a threat to its national security. The
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warming U.S.-Indian relationship is perceived as an
effort to contain China. China’s territorial integrity and
stability in its Western provinces also are at risk due to
India. The Chinese elite see the ongoing India-Pakistan
standoff as a regional “hot spot” that endangers
China’s peripheral security environment. There also
is concern about the political and social instability
of India, and the role India can play in destabilizing
Tibet. Finally, India poses a conventional threat with
its stronger navy, sophisticated arms acquisitions, and
growing nuclear arsenal declaredly built in response
to the China threat. A brief examination of India’s
threat to China as a competitor, destabilizing force, and
military adversary will illuminate why China’s elite so
enthusiastically emphasize cooperation and friendship
with India.
The Elephant vs. the Dragon.
Many members of the influential elite in China
have written recently extolling the shared interests
and similarities of China and India and their history
of diplomacy and dialogue. “The friendly contacts
between the two countries go back to ancient times,”
writes Zhang Chengming in the International Strategic
Studies journal.202 There was a degree of friendliness
in the 1950s, when India was one of the first nonCommunist countries to recognize the PRC, accepted
China’s occupation of Tibet, and invited China to attend
the Bandung Conference. Their shared values were
declared in 1954, when they signed the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence.203 Their mutual respect for
sovereignty, nonaggression, and noninterference
remains relevant today. Chinese scholars invoke these
principles as models that all countries should strive to
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follow in their international relations. And in a recent
joint statement, the countries agreed to establish a
“China-India Strategic and Cooperative Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity”—essentially a restatement of
the 1954 agreement. The countries are similar in size,
population, and age. But perhaps the most significant
similarity is the two countries’ simultaneous rise in
economic power and international stature. Lan Jianxue
with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reflected
on all of these similarities:
There are no two countries in the world that can be as
similar to each other as India and China: India gained
independence (1947) almost at the same time as the
new China was founded (1949). The two countries have
cultures that date equally far back, are equally selfrespectful in national individuality, and have equally
large populations and vast territories. At present, both
basically are in the same development phase . . . .204

Despite these similarities and the countries’
espousal of shared interests, there is a history of distrust,
aggression, and animosity that lingers just below
the surface. India’s leadership only recently stopped
referring to the 1962 Sino-Indian War as an act of
aggression by China, and the resulting border dispute
still is unresolved despite decades of negotiations. The
1998 Indian nuclear test was declared to be in response
to the China threat, an accusation the Chinese still
resent. And while the two countries’ similarities are
touted as a starting point for cooperation, the countries
are not perceived as equals in China. Zhao Gancheng,
the director of South Asia Studies at the Shanghai
Institute for International Studies, examined the
“simultaneous rising” of the two countries. He argued
that because China “got on track” in developing its
economy first and its progress is more remarkable,
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India is targeting China as a competitor: “Compared
with India, China started its reform much earlier, and
what China has achieved seems also more outstanding,
and hence a higher position and more important role
in the world system.”205 They are not, then, equals.
(Nor is the competition allowed as being China’s fault,
as discussed below.) Zhao further argued this point
through an examination of foreign trade showing
that the Indian economy has less impact on the world
economy than China’s.
In China’s calculations of comprehensive national
power, India’s inferiority is demonstrated by its 10th
place rank, behind China, which ranks itself as the
world’s 6th most powerful country.206 This is due in
part to India’s perceived lack of diplomatic power
compared to China’s. The study noted that “India’s
diplomatic strength has none of the momentum it
possessed in the 1960s and 70s, and its influence in the
third world does not measure up to that of China. In
terms of peripheral relations, India’s foreign relations
strategy lacks the spirit of sincere cooperation. . . . India’s
overall diplomatic strengths are thus lacking.”207
Besides not being equals, the two countries also are
not on warm terms. Despite the friendship rhetoric, the
two cultures have very little influence on one another,
and they conduct relatively little trade with one another.
Trade was nonexistent for much of their history. It was
suspended in 1954 as a result of the border war, and
continually halted over various disagreements about
the border, Tibet, and India’s nuclear tests. It was not
until 2002 that the two finally agreed to shelve the
border dispute and resume trade. This explains why
trade with India makes up only 1 percent of China’s
global trade. To say the least, China and India are “not
intimate neighbors,” and they “lack mutual trust.”208
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Thus, there is a concern among China’s influential
elite that India, the inferior country, has labeled China
as a competitor. Their analysis of the relationship
puts blame on the Indians for their misguided views
of China as an aggressor and a threat. As one Chinese
scholar put it, “India is screened with shadows at the
bottom of its heart that China is ‘the biggest potential
threat.’”209 They see this mistrust of China manifested
in a competition for resources, influence, trade, and
foreign direct investment. While China undoubtedly
has been aggressive in its quest for regional influence
and access to resources, the influential elite view these
actions as a necessary response to the myriad threats
China faces—competition from India being one of
them.
In the last few years, India competed with China
for oil and gas resources in Angola, Sudan, Ecuador,
Nigeria, and, most recently, Kazakhstan. India was
outbid in all of these markets. But the competition
was good for neither country, as it pushed prices up.
This explains why, in December 2005, the countries
collaborated to acquire PetroCanada’s Syrian oil and
natural gas assets. While India has not prevailed in
the bidding wars and is arguably more dependent on
foreign imports than China, the rising prices as a result
of their competition and the potential for being shut out
of certain markets still pose a serious threat to China’s
continued economic development. China’s intent in
building cooperation with India is to mitigate this
threat. (China’s increasing reliance on foreign energy
resources is perceived as a significant vulnerability;
this issue is addressed separately as a nontraditional
threat.)
The competition may be even fiercer in the arena of
foreign relations as China strives to gain influence in
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South Asia, while India vies for the same in East Asia.
The rivalry is apparent in the efforts of both countries
to join and direct various regional organizations, while
limiting the influence of the other. China is working
to maintain an edge in its influence over ASEAN and
has been accepted as an observer in the South Asia
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), much
to India’s chagrin. To China’s displeasure, India is
attempting to gain a seat on the UN Security Council
and membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and
has been accepted as an observer in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). China has continued
close cooperation with India’s rival, Pakistan, and
deepened its engagement with Bangladesh, Nepal, and
Sri Lanka, not to mention ongoing influence in Burma—
all neighbors of India. Meanwhile, India engages with
Russia, Japan, and the United States—all countries
China perceives to be working to contain it. The recent
U.S.-Indian deal regarding civilian nuclear cooperation
demonstrated to China’s influential elite the extent to
which the United States will go in “maintaining regional
strategic balance”—in other words, supporting India
in order to contain China.210 Chinese news media
explained that the special treatment given to India
occurred because India is a democracy, the Americans’
preferred model for economic development, and
therefore “is deemed the best bargaining chip and a
counterweight to China.”211
Despite the preferential treatment that foreshadows
containment and the threat to the nonproliferation
regime that the U.S.-Indian deal poses, Chinese
coverage of the deal was surprisingly balanced and
straightforward. An opinion piece in China Daily
explained that the deal was limited to civilian nuclear
cooperation (it was not about weapons) and recognized
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that the American strategic interest and intent behind
the deal really was nonproliferation. The author argued,
as many American editorialists also did, that despite
this worthy intent, the deal has repercussions for the
international nonproliferation infrastructure, and the
double standard will likely complicate such efforts in
Iran and North Korea. Perhaps even more telling of
the elites’ measured response to the deal is the credit
they afforded India for being an independent country
that would act in its own self-interest and not fall prey
to manipulation so easily: “India will still maintain an
independent and all-round diplomatic posture to gain
its own maximum state interest. India will not easily
board any ship because India itself is a large ship.”212
This nuanced and muted response that was largely
complimentary toward India is evidence of China’s
all-out diplomatic effort to promote friendship and
cooperation with that country. While this deal is hardly
satisfactory to China’s influential elite, the threat of
rivalry with India at this time is even less acceptable.
Cooperation mitigates the threat that competition with
India over resources or influence poses to China’s
continued economic development and international
standing.
The Threat to Stability and Territorial Integrity.
The unsettled disagreements over the Sino-Indian
border and Tibet may undermine China’s new-found
friendship with its neighbor. Both issues threaten
China’s territorial integrity and stability on its already
tenuous Western front. India’s own political and social
instability and its ongoing dispute with Pakistan also
increase the potential for conflict and chaos on China’s
border.
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The disagreements between China and India first
arose in the late 1950s, when China cracked down on
the Tibetan protest movement. India granted sanctuary
to the Dalai Lama in response. Border clashes erupted
around the same time as China built a road on territory
that India claimed. From the Chinese perspective,
the boundary had never been demarcated officially.
As Zhou Gang, the former Chinese ambassador to
Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and India, explained, “In
March 1914, the British colonialists cooked up an illegal
‘McMahon Line’ behind the back of the representatives
from the Chinese Central Government.”213 China
neither approved nor acknowledged this line, which
was just further proof that the West was using every
opportunity to carve up China.214 After the public SinoSoviet split (and China no longer had to heed Soviet
interests), the skirmishes erupted into a full-fledged war
as the PLA launched a “blitzkrieg-type offensive.”215
The PLA performed surprisingly well, announcing a
cease-fire after gaining its territorial objectives.216 A
peace treaty could never be agreed upon, however,
and remains unresolved to this day. (See Map 1.)
It is the one issue that Chinese scholars admit could
impede friendly cooperation with India. What is not
admitted, however, is that China was an aggressor in
1962, and thus India’s claims that China was a threat
were well-founded. Chinese unwillingness to concede
these points is an obstacle to resolution of the border
dispute, which the influential elite predict will not be
resolved anytime soon.
Much like the threat posed by the unpredictability
of American politics, India’s politics also are considered
disturbingly unstable by Chinese observers. While
Indian domestic politics are not analyzed to anywhere
near the depth of their analysis of American politics,
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Map 1. Disputed Territory between China
and India.217
some concern over the volatility of India’s democracy
is evident, particularly due its perceived inability to
deal with class and religious differences. This concern
seems to have abated in recent years, but the “conflicts
caused by caste and class contradictions have been eyecatching,” concluded a PRC scholar in 2001. “The rise
of Hindu fundamentalism” and “the issue of religious
conflict within India [are] far from resolved,” wrote
another in 2002.218 The “splittist” activities in Kashmir
also are a force for instability. The potential for a
Pakistan-India confrontation is often referred to as a
“hot spot” that poses “major challenges and hidden
perils” for China’s peripheral security environment. 219
However, this concern also has lessened as the
confrontation cooled in recent years.
In addition to the potential religious and separatist
problems within India, China is concerned with India’s
involvement in aggravating similar problems inside
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its own borders. India’s provision of sanctuary in
1959 to Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, is still
a contentious issue for China because he continues to
be politically active in exile, along with approximately
130,000 other Tibetans living in India. These Tibetans
carry out “splittist activities in India, directly
threatening [the] stability of Tibet and endangering
China’s security in its southwest region.”220 India’s
perceived sympathy for Tibetan religious freedom and
provincial independence only increases the possibility
of another Tibetan independence revolt, a direct threat
to China’s territorial integrity. An independent Tibet
would set a dangerous precedent for China. A slippery
slope of independence declarations could begin with
Tibet, lead through Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and end
in Taiwan. Suddenly, nearly half of China’s territory
and the objective it holds dearest (reunification with
Taiwan) could be lost. From this perspective, it is not
hard to understand just how threatening any loss of
territory would be.
The Traditional Military Threat.
Yet another lingering historical problem is the
conventional military threat posed by India and the
role of Russia in Sino-Indian relations. India’s navy
and its ability to project power in the Indian Ocean
long has been both intimidating and an object of envy
in the eyes of China’s elite. (As China expands its naval
capabilities, a reciprocal threat is now felt by the Indians
as well.) Another concern of the influential elite is the
procurement of arms and the modernization of India’s
nuclear program. As one analyst observed in 2001,
“The momentum of arms procurement is violent,” and
of particular concern are “the agreements with Russia
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to purchase aircraft carriers, tanks, and fighters.”221
Chinese India scholar Hu Shisheng noted that:
military technology cooperation has all along been a
vital pillar of Russia-India strategic ties. Over the last
few years, the two nations have upgraded their defense
cooperation agreements to an extent unknown in the
past . . . signing more than 350 defense cooperation
agreements. . . . Russia’s “show of favoritism toward
India at the expense of China” has precisely found
expression in three major weapons systems, namely,
multipurpose fighter jets, submarines, and antiaircraft
missiles.222

Russia’s perceived favoritism toward India has
been a sticking point since the Soviet Union split with
China and backed New Delhi in the Sino-Indian War.223
But China’s recent military cooperation with Russia
has altered this dynamic and likely has shifted some
of the threat perception to India in this arena as well.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, India’s growing
nuclear capabilities and modernizing missile force are
perceived as a threat to China. Yet India’s military
threat consisting of a strong navy, cooperation with
Russia, and a growing nuclear force is perceived as
less menacing to China than the threat India poses to
China’s economy and stability.
Concluding Thought.
India is not an overwhelming or immediate threat
to China. As Zhao Gancheng noted, the China-India
relationship is marginalized in Chinese politics.224 Lan
Jianxue admitted that the Chinese society does little
research on India and has far less understanding of
India than of other countries in Asia.225 The reason
is that “China-India relations are neither on the
basis of highly mutual trust with common strategic
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interests nor in a state of crisis that easily could lead
to confrontation.”226 Unlike the United States, which is
studied rigorously and analyzed endlessly, India does
not command such attention from China’s influential
elite. Nor does it arouse an emotional hatred like Japan
does.
That said, the sense of calm and camaraderie
portrayed currently in the writings of China’s
influential elite regarding India has more to do with
China’s self-proclaimed “charm offensive” than with
the real outlook on India. The Sino-Indian friendship
rhetoric also was common in the 1950s, right before
their border tensions escalated, trade was halted, and
war was declared.227 Today’s friendly overtones do not
erase the unresolved issues and historical resentment
between the countries. Rather, they are indicative of
the threat China perceives from India as a competitor
for vital resources and international influence, as a
destabilizing influence on its western border, and as
a conventional military and nuclear power. While
India is not considered as much of a threat as either
the United States or Japan, it does pose a threat to all
three of China’s major strategic interests: maintaining
territorial integrity, continuing economic development,
and safeguarding China’s national dignity and equality
on the world stage. The year 2006 is one of friendship
not because China and India are friends, but because
both countries fear the possibilities for competition
and conflict if they do not seem to be.
IV. CONCLUSION: CHINA’S TRADITIONAL
THREATS
This by no means has been an exhaustive survey of
the traditional threats faced by China. Other nations
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and other militaries surely pose a danger to China’s
national security. China is particularly concerned
with its Western border and the “terrorist, extremist,
and splittist” activities that could destabilize Xinjiang
province. Further, it is concerned with the threat of a
collapsed North Korea, which would prompt an influx
of refugees in northeastern China. The focus of this
monograph, however, is on the several countries that
are considered both capable of and willing to endanger
all three of China’s components of national security:
sovereignty, economic development, and international
stature. The United States, Japan, and India have
significant ideological, historical, or territorial
disagreements with China and possess the military,
economic, and diplomatic means to go to battle over
such disagreements. Further, these countries are
allies, with a shared commitment to democracy and
a perceived interest in containing China. The United
States has expanded its cooperation significantly with
both Japan and India in the last year. Thus, cooperation
among any or all of these countries in an effort to contain
China militarily, economically, or diplomatically is not
unrealistic. It is such a confluence of threats that China
fears most.
It is evident from this analysis that the United States
is of the utmost concern to the influential elite. Close
attention is paid to all American policies, whether they
are directly related to China or not. The focus of the
influential elite is not limited to policymaking. Politics
and even the American academic field also are analyzed
closely. This provides for a holistic understanding of
the United States—and leads to a perceived threat that
is equally holistic. As a result, threats from the United
States come not just from the military, but from the
extreme forces and unpredictability of the political
realm and the theories of our own influential elite.
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In contrast, what is interesting about perceptions
of Japan and India is that a similar understanding of
Japanese and Indian domestic politics is lacking. Yet
there is still a concern over the unpredictability of the
democratic process in these countries. Neocons are a
threat in Japan just as they are in the United States,
and the diverse population of India makes its political
stability seemingly fragile as well. This perceived
instability and concern over the unpredictability of the
democratic process are not surprising; they are reasons
why China’s leadership does not advance democratic
reforms in their own country. The perception of
democratic processes as destabilizing is different
fundamentally from our own belief in the inherent
stability and equilibrium that democracy provides.
While the United States and China both agree on a
democratic international order, our perceptions about
domestic democracy vary considerably. This shared
view of the world order and divergent view of internal
order are important factors in understanding and
appreciating U.S.-China relations.
Yet, as threatening as these three nations may
be to China—politically, economically, militarily—
nontraditional threats are still of greater concern.
The disagreements with the United States, Japan,
and India are not new. And they have been, for the
most part, managed successfully. But nontraditional
threats are new, and China has not yet proven that
it can successfully manage them. Military deterrence
and diplomatic skill are unlikely to prove completely
sufficient in dealing with these threats. It is to these
transnational, unpredictable, and intractable problems
that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 3
NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS
While such traditional security threats as hegemonism
and local wars are still casting a shadow on world peace
and stability, events such as the 11 September [2001]
terror incident, the atypical pneumonia epidemic, and the
Indian Ocean tsunami have indicated that nontraditional
security threats are becoming ever more prominent
and are becoming interwoven with traditional security
threats in threatening human survival and development.
How to deal with such threats and challenges originating
from nontraditional security areas has become a major
issue of common concern to countries.
PLA General Xiong Guangkai228

General Xiong Guangkai, perhaps China’s
preeminent strategic thinker, shifted his attention in
the past year from “peaceful development” (the phrase
he coined to counter the “China threat theory”) and
began talking instead about “nontraditional security
threats.” The concept has been gaining traction as
many of China’s influential elite are discussing these
new threats to their national security. Yet despite
frequent reference to “nontraditional security threats”
and the development of a new security concept for
China based on the need to address such issues, there
is no formal, agreed-upon definition. Casual inquiries
during my interviews with the influential elite in
Shanghai who used the term elicited a wide range
of explanations and examples. Instead of offering
a definition, most offered examples. All mentioned
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energy, the environment, bird flu, and terrorism as
nontraditional issues that are of increasing concern.
Beyond that, however, there were variations. One
scholar from the Center for National Strategy Studies at
Jiao Tong University included the news media and the
growing elderly population as nontraditional threats to
China’s security.229 An analyst at the Shanghai Institute
of International Studies included drug trafficking,
piracy, and WMD.230 Members of the influential elite
from the Shanghai Pacific Institute for International
Strategy (editors of the controversial Strategy and
Management journal) commented that the distinction
between traditional and nontraditional threats lay in
the means for resolving them, and that military means
cannot resolve nontraditional issues.
General Xiong recognized the difficulty in defining
nontraditional threats and tried to offer some clarity
in a 2005 Shijie Zhishi (World Affairs) article. He offered
the following four earmarks of nontraditional threats:
(1) they transcend national boundaries and are thus
transnational in nature; (2) they go beyond the military
sphere; (3) they often are sudden and unexpected; and
(4) they are frequently interwoven with traditional
security threats.231 He concluded that they are threats
that more than one nation faces and cannot be solved
by one country or by a single means. General Xiong
explained their unpredictability this way: they often
are crises that “explode in a sudden way, . . . lack clear
signs, . . . or have a strong, random character.”232 For
example, it is hard to pinpoint where and how an
infectious disease starts, or when a natural disaster or act
of terror will occur. And perhaps the most threatening
aspect of nontraditional threats is that they are likely
to occur in conjunction with or act as triggers for other
crises. As General Xiong explained, “Nontraditional
security threats and traditional security threats are
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interwoven, affect each other, and may change into
each other under certain conditions.”233
Guo Xuetang of Shanghai’s Tongji University
offered a definition of nontraditional security that
differed slightly from General Xiong’s. While Guo’s
explanation also emphasized their nonmilitary nature,
he incorporated a country’s internal problems into the
definition as well.
There are many differences of view in China and outside
over defining the concept of “nontraditional security.”
There are relatively many factors of nontraditional
security; in general it refers to various conflicts closely
linked to non-military threats; “apart from military,
political, and diplomatic conflicts, it refers to other
factors that compose a threat to the existence and
development of sovereign states and the whole of
mankind” . . . . Hence, nontraditional security can
also be called non-military security, and a country’s
internal problems can also become national security
problems. Compared with military threats whose
content is relatively simple, nontraditional security
factors are extremely wide-ranging, mainly including:
economic security, financial security, ecological [and]
environmental security, information security, resource
security, terrorism, weapon prolifer-ation, the spread
of epidemics, transnational crime, narcotics smuggling,
illegal immigration, piracy, money laundering, and so
on. A country’s internal problems also come within the
scope of national security.234

As discussed in the introduction to this monograph,
the threat of nontraditional crises increasingly is seen
as more likely and severe than those from traditional
threats. As Yu Xintian of the Shanghai Institute of
International Studies saw it:
the likelihood that China is hit by [a] nontraditional
threat is fairly high. China is vulnerable to nontraditional
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threats due to its insufficient institutional and physical
preparedness. . . . Since the 1990s, China has been
frequently hit by nontraditional security threats such
as the threat to economic security (East Asian financial
crisis), hygiene security (SARS, poultry flu, AIDS, and so
on), and environmental security threat (flood, sandstorm,
drought, and so on). Terrorism and transnational crimes
have already done harm to China’s security, and the
degree of which will only grow than drop. Diseases
and environmental problems are not new for China,
but their risks have remarkably increased thanks to
globalization and liberalization. Their internal impacts
and international domino effect will be great. Their
shock and destruction will greatly exacerbate. What are
particularly notable are the unpredictable crises and
conflicts, which are most difficult to tackle.235

This quotation captures the biggest concerns that
China’s influential elite share about nontraditional
threats. First, the line between internal and external is
blurred, and the likelihood that something completely
external to China can foment a crisis internally—or
vice versa—is very worrisome in a society that is still
adjusting to its growing participation in a globalized
world. Second, the potential for a crisis—something
unexpected and unpredictable—also is frightening.
A culture that emphasizes planning and preparation
(maximizing its shi) does not always respond flexibly
and responsively in a crisis.236 This corresponds to a
widely-held belief among the influential elite: China’s
system of governance is inadequate in the face of a crisis.
A survey of the influential elite conducted in 2004
asked experts what challenges China will face before
2010 that are most likely to impede economic and
social development. While not included specifically
as a topic for inquiry in the survey, the theme of
crises of confidence came up repeatedly: “People’s
lack of confidence in governance, in the credibility of
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enterprises and individuals, and in the government’s
credibility, policy efficiency, and transparency, as well
as worries about falsification and exaggeration by
enterprises and about the character and quality of some
individuals” were seen as likely to have a direct impact
on economic development as well as the successful
implementation of reforms.237
The same survey found that the elite believed that
the major areas of crisis in China before 2010 would
be primarily social, followed by economic, and then
political. In the social arena, widening social disparities,
unemployment, and public safety were considered
“high risk” areas. The environment was seen as the issue
most likely to spur economic crises. This issue is seen
as having a direct bearing on China’s productivity. Oil
and energy supplies, or “resource-related problems,”
also are considered an environmental issue with
serious economic implications.238
Therefore, in order to get a glimpse of Chinese
thinking on nontraditional threats, this section
examines the pressing issue of social disparity and
the economic issues associated with the environment
and energy. While this hardly can be considered a
comprehensive assessment of China’s perceptions of
nontraditional threats, it illuminates the way they are
thinking about and approaching these disparate and
complicated issues threatening China’s social and
economic development and stability. Also evident
is that while the influential elite admit an increasing
concern about nontraditional threats in general, there
is far less analysis, debate, and recommendations about
how to overcome specific nontraditional threats. This
may be because most of the action necessary to mitigate
nontraditional threats requires the Chinese leadership
to implement serious internal reforms. The debate and
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the recommendations are likely still being generated,
though not in the public sphere.
I. CHINA’S THREAT FROM WITHIN:
“DOMESTIC AND SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS”
China is in a critical juncture when two transitions
coincide, one is the taking off of modernization; the
other is the transition from planned economy to market
economy. Both are inundated with contradictions and
highly vulnerable to the outbreak of conflicts. The two
transitions being so intertwined further enlarge the
urban-countryside disparity, regional disparity, wealth
disparity, and ethnic disparity, which will evoke turmoil
if treated unskillfully.”239

China faces a dizzying array of internal problems
resulting from these “transitions.” These include urban
issues having to do with rapid industrialization and
mass internal migration; rural issues having to do with
land ownership, poverty, and the effects of globalization
on agriculture; and issues surrounding unemployment,
corruption, social security, health care, and education.
But the condition internal to China that causes the
most concern is the wide disparities that exist within
its society—between the rich and the poor, urban and
rural. There is a general inequality of opportunity or,
as it is referred to in official Chinese policy statements,
“domestic and social contradictions.” If not addressed,
these will be of great detriment to China’s stability
and security. That is why the government and the
influential elite have paid so much attention to this issue
recently, and why The 11th Five Year Plan for National
Economy and Social Development is specifically devoted
to overcoming such “contradictions.” An examination
of the extent of disparity, the elite and official attention
devoted to the issue, and the manifestation of the
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disparities as demonstrated by “mass incidents,” will
demonstrate how domestic and social contradictions
can be considered such a threat to China’s national
security.
Evidence of and Attention to China’s Disparities.
China’s Human Development Report, published
by the UN Development Programme in 2005, found
that “China remains plagued by imbalances in
development—most notably between urban and rural
areas, between regions, between sexes, and between
different population groups.”240 The development gap
is largely a result of the growing income gap. The World
Bank uses a calculation (called the “Gini coefficient”)
to determine the extent to which individual incomes
deviate from a perfectly equal distribution. This
measure indicates an individual’s relative poverty, or
how well-off one is compared to his/her countrymen.
China’s Gini coefficient has increased 50 percent in
the last 2 decades, producing huge disparities.241 For
example, the bottom 20 percent of China’s population
accounts for only 4.7 percent of total income or
consumption, while the top 20 percent of China’s
population account for 50 percent of the country’s total
income or consumption.
China’s own official report on the state of Chinese
society, published yearly by the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences and referred to as the Blue Book of Chinese
Society, reaches a more dire assessment than that of the
UN. Its calculated Gini coefficient showed an even more
unbalanced distribution of income, producing growing
instability as evidenced by mounting crime rates, land
disputes, and public clashes with government officials.
“The rich-poor disparity has led to the intensification
of social disputes, mass protests, and criminal cases,”
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wrote Zhu Qingfang, one of the study’s authors.242
A journal sponsored by the Central Party School
of the Communist Party also published a study with
notably grim predictions. Citing a report from the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the article warned
of destabilizing social phenomena. It (somewhat
surprisingly) acknowledged that many of the affluent
population “gained wealth through collusion with
officials in power-for-money deals” or “because they
stole state assets.”243 Further, the study concluded that
China’s social troubles were only beginning, since the
period when a country’s economy is growing from
$1,000 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to
$3,000 per capita GDP is likely to see increasing social
conflicts. China is now just in that stage.”244
This conclusion is cited repeatedly in elite writings
and even in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan. The message
from this finding is clear: the period of China’s strategic
opportunity also is a period of great risk. In Chinese
culture, it is natural for the two dialectic opposites
of danger and opportunity to coexist. The Chinese
government’s goal is to maximize the opportunities
(or the shi) by minimizing the risk. That the Central
Party School and the Blue Book are publishing such
grim assessments is proof that the leadership wants its
people to know that it is working hard to minimize the
dangers resulting from the society’s disparities.
Another example of this official attempt to
mitigate the dangers is The 11th Five Year Plan itself.
While laying out the direction and priorities for the
next 5 years, it emphasizes “common prosperity,”
“sustainable development,” and social services,
rather than “growth rate.” For the first time, the plan
incorporates the ideas that “economic growth does not
equal economic development, economic development
does not necessarily result in society’s development,
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and . . . growth is not the goal, but the means of
development.”245
While official policy only recently has begun to
address “domestic and social contradictions,” the
influential elite have been warning about the problem
for some time. Sun Liping, a noted sociologist, has
published a number of articles and books on the
growing divisions within Chinese society. He argues
that society is now more than simply polarized; it has
become two separate fragments, incapable of joining
together to form a cohesive whole. Sun recognizes
that, as China opens up, the most advanced parts of
society enter the world market, or “join the orbit.”
While this serves to advance even the most backward
parts of the country, it also makes the most advanced
parts of the society have more in common with the
outside world than with other parts of its own country.
These “fragments” no longer share the same concerns,
values, or priorities. Further, Sun argues that those
at the lowest rungs of society are actually outside the
social structure—they have been “discarded” and
left behind as their opportunities for reemployment
or reintegration no longer exist. The needs of these
two fragments are so diverse, the government cannot
respond to them both.246 In this “era of differentiation of
interests,” Sun advocates a system whereby people can
express their varying grievances, so that conflicts can
be avoided: “If different groups have good channels
. . . [to voice their wants, needs, and concerns] conflicts
will not be escalated.”247
Manifestation of the Disparities: “Mass Disturbances.”
The lack of an acceptable outlet for people to express
their grievances is most evident in the number of “mass
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disturbances” that occur with increasing regularity
and severity throughout China. China’s Ministry
of Public Security reported that the total number of
“mass incidents” rose to 87,000 in 2005. This was an
increase from 74,000 incidents involving the masses in
2004 and from 58,000 the year before that. The number
of people involved also increased—five-fold, from
730,000 in 1994 to 3.76 million in 2004.248 According to a
Hong Kong newspaper, the Ministry of Public Security
defines four categories of mass disturbance: “taking
shape” involves between 300 to 500 people; “midscale” involves over 500 but no more than 3,000 people;
“large-scale” involves between 3,000 and 10,000 people;
and “extra large scale” involves between 10,000 and
100,000 people.249 Admittedly, China is an enormous
country, and three million people are only a fraction
of its 1.3 billion population. But that an unsanctioned
gathering of 500 people is considered merely “taking
shape” is telling. The rate of increase in incidents and
the public admission by the government that such
unrest is a serious problem also are notable.
There are a number of reasons behind the many
public disturbances. A great majority are ignited by
land requisitions in rural areas, or by urban buildings
being dismantled and their tenants being forced to
relocate. Many are disputes regarding pay or issues
of employment (or more often, unemployment). Some
result from accidents or over concern for public safety,
or health, or the environment. Retired PLA service
members occasionally ignite protests. Sometimes the
target audience is external (e.g., Japan), but often it
is local (the police and the local Party leaders). What
they all seem to have in common is that such means are
the only way for the public to air its grievances. There
are few mechanisms in place to ensure a worker’s
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rights regarding issues of compensation, back pay,
safe working conditions, or the justice of fines by local
officials. Farmers have little recourse when their land is
taken by the government; it is only by coming together
in protest that they can draw the desired attention to
their plight.
Land disputes seem to draw a large number
of protesters: 10,000 in Guangzhou and “several
thousand” in Shanwei in December 2005; “tens of
thousands” in Guangdong province in July 2005.250
While these episodes are not always covered in the
official Chinese press, many such incidents make the
news in Hong Kong news media. One incident covered
in Xinhua was a riot in Anhui, where a large number
of people became involved in an uprising which
apparently started after a driver ran over and beat up
a pedestrian. The incident was described this way:
A mass incident occurred in Cizhou, Anhui province,
on June 26[, 2005] between the afternoon and evening.
The incident has basically been quelled thanks to the
tremendous attention shown by the Anhui provincial
CPC committee and provincial government. At 14:40
on June 26, four people who were riding in a car had
an argument with Liu Liang, a pedestrian. They beat up
and wounded Liu Liang, and the incident aroused the
disgruntlement of the masses. The local police had the
four culprits taken to the police station for investigation.
Under the rumors and instigations of a handful of lawbreakers, some people who did not know what had really
happened amassed in front of the Jiuhua Road police
station and demanded that the station hand over the
four persons. The crowd of people who were ignorant of
the facts grew in number and began beating, smashing,
looting, and burning, resulting in several armed police
and public security officers sustaining injuries and four
vehicles being destroyed. The doors and windows of
the Jiuhua Road police station were smashed, and one
supermarket was looted. The incident drew a large
crowd of spectators.251
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While the veracity of this event cannot be confirmed
and the coverage is clearly biased, it is remarkable
that the seemingly small incident—having nothing
to do with land reclamation, corruption, or unpaid
compensation—triggered such an angry large-scale
response.
Such escalations are not uncommon. Small protests
or events often grow in scope and intensity quickly,
seized on as an opportunity by the public to demonstrate its dissatisfaction. The government recognizes
the need for the public to be able to voice their
complaints; police around the country were tasked
with “receiving letters and visitors” between May
and September 2005 in hope of reducing the number
of disturbances. Xinhua reported that 180,000 of the
200,000 grievances received during those 4 months
were “dealt with.”252 Whatever this means, it is likely
an unsatisfactory method and resolution for the public.
Until an effective, credible judicial system, social safety
net, and crisis management mechanism are established
in China, individuals likely will continue to take to the
streets to make their grievances known.
Another reason for these mass incidents may be that
such wide social and economic disparities are more
disruptive and unacceptable in China than in other
countries. The society was relatively classless and had
a fairly equal distribution of wealth not so long ago. As
Li Qiang wrote in the 2000 Blue Book, “people have long
become used to the egalitarian distribution system, and
the notion in Chinese culture that unequal distribution
is a bigger problem than scarcity is rooted deeply
in people’s minds.”253 The society is fundamentally
communist in orientation and, while many today joke
that the Chinese Communist Party should be renamed
the Chinese Capitalist Party, the deep-seated ideals
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of egalitarianism and Marxism-Leninism still remain.
Thus, the gaping disparities that have emerged over
the last 20 years are not only damaging from a social
services/governance perspective, they create a crisis
of identity that threatens the Party’s legitimacy and
power. This is yet another reason why the disparities
are perceived as a menace to the nation’s stability and
security and why the government has devoted so much
attention recently to solving society’s “domestic and
social contradictions.”
II. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION:
THE THREAT TO THE EARTH, ECONOMIC
GROWTH, AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY
The effects of China’s “pollute first, control
later” philosophy are very real, since environmental
pollution directly affects the lives and well-being of
Chinese citizens. 254 The effects are different depending
on where one lives: those in the city suffer under
smog, those in the country lack potable water, those
in the southeast endure typhoons, while those in the
southwest experience severe drought. Environmental
protection is now an “unswerving national policy”
in China as a result.255 The Hu administration has
elevated environmental protection to a top priority,
equal to that of economic growth. The leadership has
demonstrated its commitment to the issue by promoting
public involvement, the concept of a “green GDP,”
and greater accountability for those in the government
who flout environmental regulations for the sake of
profit. Yet despite such emphasis, implementation
of environmental regulations remains difficult. As a
result, not only is the environment in jeopardy, but
so is the continuing economic growth of the country.
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An examination of the environmental problem (in air,
water, and land) and the way the problem manifests
itself (in climate change, extreme weather conditions,
and lack of safe drinking water) exposes the extent of
China’s pollution and the costs it imposes on China’s
development. Looking at the official policy and
the politics exposes the more ominous threat from
environmental degradation: the extent of corruption
and the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms for
implementing Party policy.
The Threat to the Earth and Economic Growth.
According to the head of China’s State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), the number one Chinese
environmental issue is clean water. Nearly 300 million
rural residents drink polluted water, and 90 percent of
the water passing through cities is polluted.256 There
is one “sudden environmental accident” every other
day on average in China, and most of these accidents
involve water pollution. Following the disastrous
chemical spill in the Songhua River in November 2005,
a spill that contaminated the drinking water of millions
downstream, SEPA ordered a review of the safety of all
chemical plants. This review concluded that nearly half
of the country’s chemical plants pose environmental
risks. Another spill like that in the Songhua could prove
highly detrimental to the country’s water supply given
that the vast majority of chemical plants are located
along the two major rivers in China, which flow for
thousands of miles and through densely populated
areas.257
China’s air quality is not much better. Largely due
to its coal burning, China has been the world’s largest
emitter of acid-rain producing sulfur dioxide since
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1995. SEPA estimated that as a result of these emissions,
economic losses over the last decade equaled more
than 500 billion RMB (equaling about 63 billion in U.S.
dollars). Monitoring of air quality in 522 of the nation’s
cities revealed that nearly 40 percent of them had
either “medium or serious” air pollution.258 Air quality
is even unsafe in office buildings. As the headline of
an investigative article in the China Daily declared, “In
Posh Office Buildings, Plenty of Bad Air Days.”259 Such
conditions are blamed for lost profits due to decreased
productivity and health care-related costs. Air quality
also is diminished by frequent dust storms that are the
result of desertification. Over 2.5 million square miles
of land have turned to desert as a result of over-grazing
and over-logging. More than 300,000 tons of heavy
yellow dust fell on Beijing in April 2006, ironically, just
days before their 37th Earth Day celebration.260
According to China’s National Environmental
Statistics Bulletin, such incidents are not rare. In 2004,
some 1,441 “environmental pollution and destruction
incidents” occurred, causing “direct economic losses
of 363.657 million RMB,” which equals approximately
45 million U.S. dollars. A further cost is the 190 billion
RMB, or roughly 23 billion U.S. dollars, China spends
on pollution management, which is 1.4 percent of
the country’s GDP.261 The hidden costs of China’s
environmental degradation are the reason that China’s
leadership is promoting the concept of a “Green GDP”—
a calculation that would reflect the negative impact
pollution has on economic growth. By quantifying
the costs imposed on the environment, it is estimated
that between 15 and 25 percent of China’s GDP would,
in effect, be cancelled out. As much as 2 percent of
China’s annual growth rate, which exceeded 9 percent
for the past 2 years, therefore would be deducted
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with such a calculation.262 Besides reflecting the costs
of environmental damage, the concept is intended
to counteract localities’ overemphasis on economic
development at the expense of environmental quality.
By using such a measurement as an evaluation tool
for local officials, the Central Government would be
able to reassert control over those who compromise
environmental quality for the sake of profit. But
coming up with an accurate way to calculate the green
GDP has proven difficult, and political infighting
between SEPA (a strong advocate of the measure) and
the National Statistics Bureau (tasked with coming up
with the technical specifications for the measurement)
has left the concept as just that—a concept. Despite
the political controversy and technical challenges,
the Central Leadership remains committed to an
accounting method that reflects the adverse effects of
development on the environment.
One of the most difficult effects to quantify is the
extreme weather and the results of climate change on
China. While the cause of global warming is debated
in the United States, its effects are very real in China,
an example being the unusually harsh typhoon season
in 2006. The Vice Minister of the Ministry of Water
Resources commented that “against the backdrop
of global warming . . . the strength of typhoons [is]
increasing, the destructiveness of typhoons that have
made landfall is greater, and the scope in which they
are traveling is farther than normal.”263 While excessive
rain crippled some regions, excessive drought affected
others. Southeastern China reeled from Typhoon Samoi
in August 2006, the most severe storm in 50 years, at
the same time that neighboring Sichuan province was
grappling with a severe drought. More than 17 million
people in southwest China suffered from an inadequate
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water supply as a result of this drought and excessive
heat. Economic losses were estimated at 1.5 billion
dollars due to the lack of harvest.264
According to the Red Cross of China, 300 million
people were affected by these and other natural
disasters between January and August 2006—some
1,699 were killed, 415 were missing, and 5 million
homes and more than 32 million hectares of farmland
were destroyed. Losses totaled more than 16.25 billion
dollars.265 The future looks even more ominous if such
trends continue. A Chinese meteorologist predicts
that if greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise,
precipitation in China’s major river valleys will decline
by 30 percent by 2040.266 Tibet is experiencing the
opposite effect—roads, lakes, and homes are flooding
as a result of rising ground temperatures. Known as
the “roof of the world,” the Tibetan plateau is very
sensitive to climate changes and has been among the
first regions to feel the effects of global warming.267
The Threat to Central Control.
Because the effects of environmental degradation
are so visible and so clearly detrimental to the health
and well-being of Chinese citizens, the population
demands that attention be given to the issue. Many of
the “mass disturbances” that occur are in protest of local
industrial pollution and the lack of action taken by local
officials to enforce regulations and impose penalties.
As we have seen, the Central Government has taken
action and responded to public protest by making the
environment a clear policy priority. A White Paper on
Environmental Protection from 1996 to 2005 touts the
country’s record of environmental protection policies
over the last 10 years.268 A commitment to “sustainable
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development” and tough compulsory environmental
protection targets as part of the 11th Five-Year Plan
also demonstrated the leadership’s priorities. But
local officials do not share the same priorities, and
they have yet to implement environmental policies
effectively. Pan Yue, the outspoken director of SEPA,
made this observation about local priorities: “Many
provinces failed to meet the major environmental
protection targets of the 10th Five-Year Plan, although
they have met and exceeded the plan’s GDP targets in
advance.”269 Despite local governments and factories
signing “responsibility pledges” committing to reduce
pollutants, the total volume of major pollutants
discharged rose during the first 6 months of 2006. The
mandatory reduction of major pollutants by 10 percent
in the next 5 years seems unlikely to be achieved.
The cover-up of the chemical contamination of the
Songhua River in November 2005 is the most recent
and well-known example of the competing priorities
between local and Central governments. As the polluted
water flowed towards neighboring Heilongjiang
Province and ultimately Russia, the chemical plant and
the local officials first denied and then downplayed the
extent of the spill. Once its magnitude was exposed,
local officials and business leaders received strong
condemnation from the national leadership and from
the influential elite. A high-ranking Party leader had
this to say in relation to the incident:
There is really no excuse for allowing a public safety and
health crisis of such magnitude to happen in this day and
age, after we have gone through the trials and tribulations
of the “atypical pneumonia” outbreak, the development
of an emergency response mechanism over a period of
more than two years, and the gradual formation and
extension of the accountability system. This incident
tells us that besides making further improvements
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to the various contingency plans that industries and
departments have drawn up and strengthening the
development of related rules and regulations, our
government officials and government departments also
are required to improve their level of competence in
their functions of governance in a substantive manner,
so that they can truly get to the point of exercising their
power for the people, concerning themselves with the
well-being of the people, and working for the interests
of the people.270

Calls for accountability and openness were widespread. While there are sufficient regulatory directives
on the books to prevent such contamination and to
punish those responsible for it when contamination
does occur, enforcement and punishment are rare. As
a professor of Political Science and Law from China
University noted, “Despite the great losses resulting
from last year’s pollution of the Songhua River, no one
has been made to pay. This is nothing but countenancing
polluting.”271 The Central Government attempted
to consolidate its regulatory power by opening
several regional SEPA offices in order to bypass local
protectionism and corruption. They also considered
evaluating local officials based on their performance in
balancing development and environmental protection.
But enforcement of the already robust regulations and
laws regarding the environment and punishment of
offenders are still lacking.
Several of the influential elite recognized that the
disconnect between Central and local leadership posed
a threat to the environment as early as 1998. Grave
Concerns, a book authored by two economists with
China’s Academy of Social Sciences, posited that poor
coordination, structural problems, and corruption were
the real threats to China’s environment. They warned
that corruption was the most serious form of pollution,
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predicting that if coordination between Central and
local governments was not increased, “sustainable
development” would be unattainable.272
Such coordination is still lacking. The Central
Government recognizes the threats that environmental
degradation pose: First, to environmental quality;
second, to sustaining the rate of economic growth; and,
third, to its own control over the country. But it has been
unable to implement its policies fully to minimize these
threats. The country’s lack of effective mechanisms for
governance—in addition to local corruption—leave it
vulnerable to increasing rates of pollution, decreased
rates of economic growth, and potential instability as
the gap between local and Central Leadership widens
and the population’s concerns fail to be addressed.
III. ENERGY INSECURITY: CHINA’S “SOFT RIB”
The short supply of energy resources is a “soft rib” in China’s
economic and social development.
Premier Wen Jiabao273

Government efforts to promote conservation in
Chinese society are not simply about the environment.
The Central Leadership’s emphasis on building a
“resource-saving society at an accelerating pace” also is
about China’s energy security. Wen Jiabao recognized
in a 2005 Teleconference on Building a ResourceSaving Society that “energy, mineral, water, land, and
other natural resources are the material foundations
and guarantees for sustainable economic and social
development.” He criticized the country’s “rather
serious phenomenon of wastefulness in resources”
which, “in addition to abetting unhealthy tendencies in
society, aggravated the contradiction between supply
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and demand of resources; caused coal, electricity, and
oil shortages and transportation strains; worsened
environmental pollution; and heightened the reliance
on foreign countries for continuous imports of major
resources.” He called China’s short supply of energy
resources China’s “soft rib” in its development,
warning that the country’s energy consumption was not
sustainable. He encouraged “accelerating the building
of a resource-saving society” as it is “a key measure to
guarantee economic security and national security.” He
then provided a detailed list of reforms and regulations
to promote conservation. Urging leading cadres at all
levels to set the example “in practicing economy and
opposing extravagance,” the premier went so far as to
suggest ideal temperature settings for government air
conditioners (nothing below 26 degrees Celsius) and a
relaxed dress code (no suits unless important events or
meeting with foreigners).274
Wen Jiabao’s speech and the extent of his
recommendations reflect the importance China’s
Central Leadership places on the energy issue. This
issue is considered a matter of national strategic
significance and one that has considerable impact on
whether or not China can sustain its development. It
also is perceived as an issue over which the Chinese have
little control, given their reliance on foreign imports
and foreign security of their lines of transportation.
These dependencies on foreign supply—the “reliance
problem”—and security—“the Malacca dilemma” (so
named because of the vast quantities of oil that must
pass through the Malacca Strait, which is secured
by other countries’ navies)—are the main threats to
China’s energy security.275 After examining these
dependencies, we will consider what China is doing
to minimize these threats and why, despite such
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efforts, the lack of effective governmental mechanisms
to respond in a crisis may still leave China’s energy
market insecure and vulnerable.
The Threat of Foreign Reliance.
China was a self-sufficient energy-producing
country until 1993. But while its oil consumption grew
by more than 55 percent from 1994 to 2000, its oil
production increased by only 11 percent. Its imports
grew more than 20-fold as it became the world’s
second-leading oil importer (behind Japan). Foreign
oil imports now account for 40 percent of China’s
energy market, with the gap between supply and
demand continuing to widen.276 According to a report
by China’s Academy of Geological Sciences, by 2020
China will need to import 500 million tons of crude oil
and 100 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually,
which is 70 percent and 50 percent of its domestic
consumption, respectively.277 The huge extent to which
China’s energy market depends on foreign imports is
thus a key indicator of China’s lack of energy security.
Perhaps even more significant is the rate at which
the country has moved from self-sufficient exporter
to overdependent importer. To a country that is still
new to market economics and globalized trade, such
newly emergent dependence on the unpredictable
and uncontrollable “free market” is unnerving. Price
fluctuations have an immediate impact on all national
economies and easily can halt China’s stable rate of
economic growth. While China imported 3.9 percent
more oil in the first half of 2005 than during the same
period the year before, the cost of the imports was 42.2
percent higher.278 As one member of the influential elite
noted, “The expense of China on the import of crude
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and refined oil is drastically increasing, mainly resulting
from the rise of oil prices, [which] has led to tremendous
pressure on the economic development of China.”279
Another observer noted, “Energy supply disruptions
and unpredictable price soar could undermine China’s
rapid economic growth and job creation, and in turn
raise the real specter of social instability and [impaired]
national security.”280 There is no shirking this issue; the
influential elite and the policymakers both concede the
adverse impact that problematic energy supplies can
have on China’s national security.
More worrisome than an over-reliance on foreign
imports is the extent to which the reliance is confined
to one region—the Middle East. Not only is this region
the most volatile part of the world, it is embroiled in
geopolitics and is the centerpiece of American foreign
policy. While 18 percent of U.S. oil comes from the Gulf,
60 percent of China’s imported oil comes from there,
and most of that comes from just three countries: Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Because import sources are
limited and the United States and Japan have a lock on
much of the oil market, China is forced to find alternate
suppliers. The result is a Chinese energy policy that not
only competes with U.S. energy demands, but comes
into conflict with U.S. containment policies in Iran and
Sudan.
The “Malacca Dilemma.”
The over-reliance on oil from the Middle East
and Africa leads to an over-reliance on the Malacca
Straits, considered by the influential elite to be highly
susceptible to blockade, as China’s shipping route.
Without any pipelines to route its oil through and only
a small portion of oil coming from Venezuela (and thus
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crossing the Pacific Ocean from the east), 85 percent of
China’s oil passes through the Indian Ocean, Malacca
Strait, and the South China Sea. Thus, any interference
in this “strategic passageway” by nations trying to
contain China or by pirates or terrorists intent on
disrupting the global market could halt nearly all of
China’s energy supply. President Hu Jintao expressed
his concern over the “Malacca dilemma,” noting
that “certain powers have all along encroached on
and tried to control the navigation route through the
strait.”281 Along with China’s influential elite, President
Hu recognizes that normal oil imports “may not be
guaranteed and China’s daily life, economy, and even
defense may be greatly impacted.”282
Insufficient Efforts to Overcome Energy Insecurity.
Even more threatening is China’s inability to do
anything about this foreign reliance. China lacks the
naval power to patrol the sea lanes and thus depends
on other littoral states in the region, plus the presence in
the area of the American, Indian, and Japanese navies,
to do this for them. While Chinese ships account for
nearly 60 percent of the ships passing through the
Strait of Malacca each day, it is not Chinese ships that
protect them.
Both of these dependency problems—supply and
security—are so troubling to China’s influential elite
because of China’s lack of military and diplomatic
means to overcome them. While the influential elite
usually boast of China’s growing global influence, when
it comes to energy security, the scholars’ assessments of
the extent of China’s military and diplomatic influence
are much more sober. The influential elite are critical
of their country’s ability to secure sea lanes or develop
new markets, especially in contrast to the United States.
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For example, one scholar looked at Central Asia and
marveled at the influence the United States has in the
region (due to taking advantage of “the opportunity
created by the antiterror war”) and its ability to develop
the market for its own needs. While he admitted that
China is “a player in the competition for oil in Central
Asia, its influence is rather limited.”283 Another scholar
based his comparison on an “energy security index,”
which assumes that energy security is proportional to a
country’s diplomatic and military influence over world
affairs and inversely proportional to its dependency
on foreign oil. Thus, while the United States depends
more on foreign oil than China, it has more influence
over world affairs, thus making it less vulnerable to
risks than China.284
There also is a certain stigma that the influential
elite attach to the energy issue and the prominent role
it plays in geopolitics, which makes China’s lack of
clout on this issue so unnerving. China’s influential
elite perceive energy as an issue over which countries
fight wars. They point to the war in Iraq as proof of
this: “Oil is the crux in the rivalry between various
forces in the world.”285 Wang Haiyun, a member of
the influential elite with the State Council, argued that
energy as an issue has risen in status and is being used
increasingly as a “strategic weapon in the pursuit of
national political, economic, and security interests.”286
He warned that, for energy-exporting states, the
“power of the energy weapon can be placed on par
with that of nuclear weapons,” as it can be used as
both a deterrent and a weapon in warfare, can be used
strategically or tactically, and can be used as a carrot
or a stick. The dispute between Russia and Ukraine
over natural gas is an example of the use of the
energy weapon—and proof that Russia is an “energy
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superpower.” Wang also examined U.S. policies of
promoting the “China energy threat theory,” which
included criticizing Chinese energy cooperation with
Iran and Sudan, obstructing the purchase of Unocal by
a Chinese corporation, and maintaining its worldwide
military presence as efforts “to control the energy
lifeblood of a rising China.”287 These actions serve to
remind the influential elite of U.S. power regarding the
energy issue and the vulnerability of their country to
the “energy weapon.”
This vulnerability has prompted the influential
elite to be openly critical of their country’s lax energy
security and to recommend numerous policy changes
to the Central Leadership. (This is in contrast to their
silence on recommendations for overcoming societal
disparities or pollution.) Many opinion writers
emphasize the need for—and China’s right to—ensure
its own energy security. Most elite recommendations
include developing new markets and transit routes,
enhanced cooperation, and an enhanced naval
capability. Above all else, though, the influential elite
overwhelmingly agree that cooperation is needed in
order to increase energy security. In all the discussions
that this author had with members of the influential
elite in Shanghai, cooperation with the United States
over energy security was advocated. The Chinese elite
recognize the similar concerns of the United States and
China over energy security: a mutual interest in fair
energy prices, a stable supply, secure transit routes, and
development of clean alternative sources of energy. To
the Chinese elite, it seems like a natural opportunity
for “win-win” collaboration.
Therefore, it is puzzling to many of the elite as to
why the United States seems intent on portraying China
as a competitor on this issue. Numerous congressional
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hearings, as well as the U.S.-China Economy and
Security Committee, concluded that China’s increasing
energy demands are a security concern for the United
States. These conclusions only confirm Chinese fears
that the United States intends to use the “energy
weapon” and “impose strategic energy containment”
on China.288 This concern, that the United States might
try to cut off China’s oil lifeline in order to destabilize
the country, is widespread.
China’s leadership has taken many of the influential
elite’s recommendations for enhancing energy security,
but they also are trying to downplay the “China energy
threat theory” and prove to the United States that they
are not a competitor. They, like the influential elite
who advise them, have determined that cooperation
is key: “In order to prevent the possibility of some big
power’s using the energy weapon to counter China’s
further rise, China must thwart some countries’
attempts to contain us on the energy issue and hinder
China’s rise. The method is to unfold effective bilateral
or multilateral cooperation on energy sources.”289 The
Chinese thus have engaged vigorously in “energy
diplomacy” to develop new markets, promote
energy cooperation, and find new transportation
routes. (American criticism of this also is perplexing;
the Chinese consider this to be free market activity,
demonstrated and promoted by the United States.)
According to Pang Zhongying, “The fundamental goal
of China’s energy diplomacy is to achieve a win-win
situation. In other words, China wants to have joint
stability, prosperity, and development with concerned
energy supply countries, regions, and companies.”290 It
also is trying to diversify sources internally (to include
investments in wind, solar, and nuclear energy); build
a strategic reserve; and build naval and air capacity so
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it has the capability to project power in the Malacca
Strait and perhaps fulfill offers to cooperate in Strait
security with Indonesia and Malaysia.
While diplomacy may prove fruitful in expanding
markets, routes, and relationships, there is still concern
that China’s governance in relation to energy is
inadequate. The government dismantled the Ministry
of Energy in 1993, and energy-related policymaking has
been diffuse and disjointed ever since. The government’s
think tank, the Development Research Centre of the
State Council, after conducting 2 years of research,
concluded that China’s energy challenges went beyond
soaring consumption and environmental degradation,
and included as well “an inefficient decisionmaking
process, poor efficiency, and growing exposure to
the global market.”291 The council recommended
reestablishing a cabinet ministry to oversee energy
security. A National Energy Leading Group headed by
Wen Jiabao was set up to reestablish a comprehensive
energy strategy. But the oft-mentioned “mechanisms”
needed to regulate the market are still lacking. There
are no means to stabilize market development of
China’s energy industry (it was deregulated much later
than most). There is insufficient ability to monitor and
analyze market supply and demand, which is important
in regulating the market effectively.292 Again, the
leadership has recognized the threats posed to China’s
energy security and demonstrated its commitment to
addressing it. But whether the leadership’s priorities
can be implemented is yet to be seen.
Thus, similar to the threats from China’s internal
disparities and environmental degradation, the threat
to energy security is two-fold. While China’s supply of
energy resources is vulnerable to foreign intervention,
given its reliance on foreign markets and vulnerable sea
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lanes, it is the lack of internal structural mechanisms
to enforce central leadership priorities and regulate
the domestic market effectively that may prove most
threatening to China’s energy security.
IV. CONCLUSION: CHINA’S NONTRADITIONAL
THREATS
This examination of several of China’s most
pressing nontraditional threats demonstrates that
they are of increasing concern to China’s influential
elite not only because of their transnational nature,
unpredictability, and intractability. Nontraditional
threats also expose the extent to which China’s central
leadership is unable to implement its policy priorities.
While the government should be given due credit
for recognizing and admitting the problems China is
facing with regard to social and economic disparities,
the environment, and its lack of energy security, it
has yet to prove that its focus on the problems and
commitment to resolving them are sufficient. It is
true that mitigating nontraditional threats will take
transnational cooperation, and that China has made
great strides engaging in relationships of “mutual
benefit.” But if China is going to reach its desired goals
of continued economic and social development during
its window of strategic opportunity, it also will need
to make internal reforms. It will need to strengthen its
social safety net, judicial system, and its mechanisms for
resolving public concerns. It will need to become more
flexible in responding in times of crisis. It will need to
more effectively enforce penalties for corruption and
pollution. China’s nontraditional threats are more
menacing than traditional ones because they require
China’s leadership not only to look outward, but to
look inward as well.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
This monograph was meant to provide, first, a
survey of several of the myriad traditional and nontraditional threats facing China as perceived by the
Chinese themselves. By taking a strictly Chinese
perspective, it demonstrated that despite China’s
secretive nature, much can be understood about how
the Chinese perceive themselves, the world, and their
role within it. Official Chinese actions and motivations
are not opaque or difficult to understand when we take
the time to see the world as China does. Seeing the
world from China’s vantage is not difficult, either, since
many of China’s influential elite are willing and eager
to engage candidly with their American counterparts.
If we took the time and effort to understand Chinese
society, history, and culture in the same way they
understand ours, seeing the world through China’s
eyes would come naturally.
Second, the monograph has demonstrated that
China’s national security concept is very comprehensive. Analysis has proven that China’s national security
threats are wide-ranging and are not limited to the
threat of military confrontation. While sovereignty
and territorial integrity are a significant national
priority, continuing economic and social development
and maintaining its status on the world stage also
are strategic priorities. Thus, any effort to undermine
China’s economy, inhibit its flow of strategic natural
resources, incite its public, or even undermine its
international influence are considered threatening to
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China’s national security. With such a broad national
security concept, the threats that China faces are not only
numerous, they also are very difficult to ameliorate.
Thus, the Chinese government has its work cut
out for it. In addition to building a military capability
that can deter aggression, assure maritime security,
and dissuade Taiwan from declaring independence, it
must convince the United States that its containment
policies are founded on a flawed theory of the China
threat. It must convince its own public that its historical
hatred of Japan is doing more to threaten its national
security than Japan itself. It must convince India that
it is a friendly neighbor who would rather cooperate
than compete. And it must convince its own local Party
officials that the Central Government’s policies are the
best course in assuring national security and stability.
Internally, it must make serious reforms in order to be
able to implement national policies intended to address
disparities, reduce pollution, and punish corruption.
Therefore, China must work assiduously on
international diplomacy and internal reforms in order
to minimize the various risks posed during China’s
period of strategic opportunity. This is what Chinese
policymakers have set out to do. Their actions are not
inconsistent with this analysis of their perceptions.
The Hu administration’s pursuit of policies to ensure
peaceful, sustainable development at home and
cooperation on behalf of mutual benefit on the world
stage are not aggressive policies cloaked in rhetoric;
they are an attempt to address the security threats
China considers most troublesome. The motivations
of the Chinese leadership therefore are not completely
hidden or incomprehensible.
Finally, this monograph has shown that the Chinese
perspective is very different from our own, borne of
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different histories, experiences, and priorities. But it is
not necessarily one with a different view of the future.
Both the United States and China aspire to a future with
a free, open, and robust economic marketplace and
an international order where all nations contribute to
peace, development, and prosperity—in other words, a
world where we are all “responsible stakeholders.” We
should pursue these common objectives together and
work to maintain the current international order that
benefits us both. Further, many of the nontraditional
threats that China faces—terrorism, WMD proliferation,
environmental degradation, resource dependency, and
even social disparities—are threats the United States
faces as well. Instead of focusing on the potential
threat we are to one another, perhaps our time, energy,
and resources could be better spent cooperating to
overcome mutual threats. In so doing, the threat we
pose to each other might not seem so ominous.
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